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Public Relations Litigation 
Kishanthi Parella*† 
Conventional wisdom holds that lawsuits harm a corporation’s 
reputation. So why do corporations and other businesses litigate even when they 
will likely lose in the court of law and the court of public opinion? One 
explanation is settlement: some parties file lawsuits not to win but to force the 
defendant to pay out. But some business litigants defy even this explanation; 
they do not expect to win the lawsuit or to benefit financially from settlement. 
What explains their behavior?  
The answer is reputation. This Article explains that certain types of 
litigation can improve a business litigant’s reputation in the eyes of its key 
constituents—constituents that help it succeed in the marketplace. It is their 
changed views of the litigant—and subsequent actions taken based on those 
changed views—that provide the financial benefit from a lawsuit that the court 
may not deliver. For example, technology companies use patent litigation to 
discourage employee flight, consumer products companies may use litigation to 
affect consumers’ opinions about competitors, and some corporate plaintiffs may 
even use litigation to address reputational harm following a crisis. In all these 
examples, business litigants may benefit from the reputational effects of the 
litigation even if they lose in court. 
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This Article makes two contributions. Descriptively, it challenges the 
conventional wisdom that lawsuits are always bad for business by revealing 
hidden incentives found outside the courthouse that are neglected in the 
standard explanation for litigant behavior. Specifically, it explains how 
litigation can contribute to reputation-building through signaling or framing 
strategies. It also describes how this reputation-building can result in different 
types of distributed gains: interparty, intertemporal, and interinstitutional. 
Practically, it highlights that the legal rules that could address this reputation-
building may lack utility due to the timing of reputational effects in litigation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 It is no secret that lawsuits often harm a party’s reputation. As 
this Article explains, however, litigation can also offer reputational 
benefits for business litigants even if they do not prevail in court. This 
is because businesses depend on resources from a variety of actors, 
including suppliers, investors, employees, consumers, and even local 
communities.1 The publicity around litigation can affect these actors’ 
perceptions of the corporate parties and influence their decisions about 
whether to provide or withhold their particular resource.2 It is these 
actors’ changed views of the business litigant—and the subsequent 
actions those changed views prompt—that provide the financial benefit 
that the court may not directly deliver.  
For example, some companies use patent litigation to gain a 
reputation for litigiousness that discourages employees from defecting 
to a rival.3 One CEO of such a company “reportedly issued a blanket 
order to his general counsel to file two IP lawsuits per quarter to 
 
 1. See, e.g., JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 2 (1978): 
[N]o organization is completely self-contained. Organizations are embedded in an 
environment comprised of other organizations. They depend on those other 
organizations for the many resources they themselves require. Organizations are linked 
to environments by federations, associations, customer-supplier relationships, 
competitive relationships, and a social-legal apparatus defining and controlling the 
nature and limits of these relationships. Organizations must transact with other 
elements in their environment to acquire needed resources . . . . 
 2. See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobacci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational 
Sanctions, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 189, 190–91 (2014). 
 3. Martin Ganco et al., More Stars Stay, but the Brightest Ones Still Leave: Job Hopping in 
the Shadow of Patent Enforcement, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 659, 660 (2015) (explaining that patent 
enforcement is a reputation-building strategy for plaintiff corporations because it is costly and 
observable, signaling to current employees that the corporation will litigate to defend its 
intellectual property and thereby discouraging employees from leaving the corporation to join or 
form a competitor). 
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dissuade engineers from ‘walking out the door’ with proprietary 
technologies.”4 Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”) also engage in 
litigation even if they expect to lose money on the lawsuit in order to 
develop a similar reputation for litigiousness.5 For them, victory is not 
offered by a court but by the court’s audience; by demonstrating that 
they will litigate, plaintiffs persuade other companies to license even 
those patents that are very broad and likely invalid.6 In the defamation 
context, corporations file lawsuits in response to unfavorable online 
reviews in order to send a message to the public, refuting the 
allegations, and to investors, assuring them that the corporation is 
stable.7 What all these examples have in common is that victory, and 
its associated financial rewards, does not come from a court but from 
outside it.8 Reputational benefits may provide the missing value in an 
otherwise negative expected value lawsuit.9 And these reputational 
benefits may grow further because of social media and online access, 
which have expanded the public audience for litigation. In addition to 
reading excerpts from filings in news stories, the public can also read 
full court filings made available online by news media or, sometimes, 
the parties themselves.10 The link between the courts of law and public 
 
 4. Rajshree Agarwal et al., Reputations for Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications 
for Knowledge Spillovers Via Inventor Mobility, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1349, 1350 (2009).  
 5. Erik Hovenkamp, Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities Use 
Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents 1, 3 (Aug. 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2308115 [https://perma.cc/2ZUH-JLKU] (explaining that patent 
litigation may persuade potential targets to accept licensing terms by establishing a credible threat 
of future litigation).  
 6. Id. (manuscript at 2).  
 7. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 
DUKE L.J. 855, 877 (2000). In libel litigation, 
[p]laintiffs do not have to sue to win; they can win by suing. Ultimate judicial victory 
would be desirable, but not necessary. The suit is a symbolic means of vindicating the 
claim of falsehood, and it is the act of suit that largely accomplishes this. While very 
few plaintiffs win, and the incidence of judicial victory is smallest with public officials, 
the vast majority of plaintiffs who lost indicate that they would sue again, knowing 
what happened . . . . 
Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record Straight, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 226, 228–29 (1985). 
 8. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477, 487 (2004) 
(“The lawyers’ and plaintiffs’ interest in the lawsuit is not solely winning or losing in court, but in 
getting their message out to the broader public or a particular group.”). 
 9. Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–5) (explaining how reputational benefits of 
patent litigation compensate for lawsuits that are unlikely to succeed).  
 10. The relationship between social media and litigation is not unilateral. While litigation 
can fuel social media activity, social media activity can also increase the possibility and affect the 
outcomes of litigation by increasing the information available to attorneys. Andy Radhakant & 
Matthew Diskin, How Social Media Are Transforming Litigation, LITIG. J. (Spring 2013), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litigation_journal/2012_13/spring/soc
ial-media-transformation [https://perma.cc/PT3L-BEJJ]:  
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opinion are becoming even tighter so that acts undertaken in the former 
are more likely to resonate in the latter.11 
All these examples illustrate the different ways that litigation 
functions as a reputation-building activity for a corporation or other 
business party, influencing how its constituents and rivals view it and 
subsequently interact with it. This Article addresses two questions that 
stem from this understanding: first, how does litigation help build a 
business’s reputation, and second, how do businesses benefit from this 
reputation building?  
First, litigation can build a party’s reputation through signaling 
or framing. Each of these mechanisms communicate information 
concerning the litigant to a broader audience than the court; this 
information can influence the way that third-party actors perceive the 
litigant. However, these mechanisms differ on the types of information 
revealed. Each mechanism, then, provides a different answer to the 
question, “A reputation for what?” 
Reputation building through signaling occurs when the act of 
filing a lawsuit is the salient information that builds a litigant’s 
reputation. This information often helps to build a plaintiff’s reputation 
as litigious or willing and able to file a lawsuit. This reputation makes 
the plaintiff’s future threat to sue more credible, thereby increasing the 
odds that a future party will acquiesce to the plaintiff’s demands rather 
than go to court.12 In contrast, reputation building through framing 
occurs when the content of the legal narrative is the relevant 
information that influences how stakeholders view plaintiffs (and 
possibly defendants). Here, the salient information is not the fact that 
the plaintiff filed the lawsuit but the information that the lawsuit 
 
[O]nline profiles often provide treasure troves of information about parties, lawyers, 
witnesses, experts, and even judges. The openness of social media—and users’ 
willingness to tweet and post things they would never dream of saying in a letter or an 
email—means that social networks offer rich repositories of potential pre-litigation 
intelligence and fodder for cross-examination.; 
id. (“Clients can jeopardize privilege and, in some cases, have been held to have waived it by 
tweeting, blogging, or posting information about their cases.”).  
 11. However, the resort to private arbitration and other forms of litigation confidentiality 
may compromise the flow of information from courts of law to the court of public opinion. See 
Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s New Rules 
Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (2004); Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy 
in Context: The Shadowy Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 583–84 (2006); 
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-
Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3) (explaining that “many of the most 
litigious PAEs’ are in fact engaging in a profitable strategy of predatory patent litigation, and that 
this is actually the most effective way to monetize bad patents.”).  
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reveals about the parties.13 Certainly, discovery may influence parties’ 
reputations, but early-stage litigation documents may also attract 
media attention and thereby communicate differing narratives 
concerning the parties’ acts. 
Through either mechanism, litigation can help a business 
litigant influence its reputation. This prompts the second question: How 
does this reputation building benefit the party, especially if it loses in 
court? This Article argues that reputational gains can come in three 
varieties: intertemporal, interparty, and interinstitutional. 
Intertemporal gains are benefits separated in time. A business or other 
actor may receive only a fraction of the benefit of its action at a moment 
in time; it enjoys the rest of the benefit once that benefit “matures” in 
the future. In the litigation context, Party A may lose a lawsuit against 
Party B, but that is not the end of the story; Party A may win in the 
long term if the reputational effect of the lawsuit influences its 
interactions with Party B in the future, whether in the courtroom or 
outside of it. Its willingness to litigate may make its future threat to 
sue more credible, which can benefit it in its future interactions with 
Party B or, more likely, Party C.14 Reputational gains are often 
interparty, so that the reputational gains are produced in an interaction 
with one party but enjoyed against another. Party A may lose a 
particular lawsuit against Party B concerning a low-stakes issue, but 
the reputational gain from that lawsuit (through signaling or framing) 
is the real benefit that Party A gains, assuming its reputational change 
allows it to extract something of value from Party C in the future. 
Finally, interinstitutional gains occur when the benefits are created on 
one playing field but enjoyed on another. For example, the parties may 
battle it out in a lawsuit but feel the real consequences in public opinion 
or at the negotiating table. While distinct, these gains often overlap. 
This insight is both familiar and new. Approximately two 
hundred years ago, Jeremy Bentham explained, “Under the auspices of 
publicity, the cause in the court of law, and the appeal to the court of 
public opinion, are going on at the same time.”15 Bentham defined 
 
 13. Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 910 (2018) (“[L]itigation 
releases information about organizational conduct into the public domain.”).  
 14. See Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 660 (“[P]atent enforcement [is] a reputation-building 
strategy rather than a particular tactic launched against a particular target: by engaging in costly 
and observable litigious action, firms build reputations for being tough in safeguarding their 
intellectual property (IP).”); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry 
Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280, 281 (1982) (explaining how predation against the first new 
entrant by the incumbent firm builds its reputation as a predator that may discourage other new 
entrants in the future); Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 3). 
 15. JEREMY BENTHAM, Publicity in Courts of Justice, in BETHAMIANA: OR SELECT EXTRACTS 
FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139 (John Hill Burton ed., 1844).  
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public opinion as a “system of law, emanating from the body of the 
people.”16 Like its judicial counterpart, the court of public opinion also 
judges individuals and organizations for their acts and provides 
penalties or awards based on those judgments.17 Unlike law courts, 
however, its enforcement is purely reputational: it levies reputational 
losses on those judged harshly and bestows reputational gains on those 
judged well.18 While separate, activities in one court can still influence 
outcomes in the other.19  
 
 16. Id. at 48; see also Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the 
Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 1018–19 (2018): 
A “public” is a specific kind of social organization that arises within the “public sphere” 
by uniting strangers through common exposure to common texts. . . . [T]he people who 
comprise publics do not meet in the public street or in the public square, but instead 
“are all sitting in their own homes scattered over a vast territory, reading the same 
newspaper.” 
(quoting JOHN B. THOMPSON, THE MEDIA AND MODERNITY: A SOCIAL THEORY OF THE MEDIA 126–
27 (1995)); id. at 1023 (“Reading newspapers brought the masses into the circle of conversation 
that produced public opinion . . . .”).  
 17. Fred Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321, 
328 (1999).  
 18. See id. Much of Bentham’s discussion of public opinion is devoted to its role in checking 
abuses of political power. Id. at 322. However, the “Public Opinion Tribunal” has broader 
jurisdiction and this Article examines its effects on reputational judgments of private as opposed 
to public actors. 
 19. See Tamar Frankel, Court of Law and Court of Public Opinion: Symbiotic Regulation of 
the Corporate Management Duty of Care, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 353, 361 (2007) (“[T]his restatement 
of the law is addressed to the media and the public as well. It influences, if not guides them, to the 
final judgment. It points to the Court of Public Opinion.”). Each court can serve as a check on the 
other. Courts of law check the court of public opinion regarding information that is already in the 
public but may be incorrect. See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal 
System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1194, 1196 (2016) (“Contrary 
to the common assumption, law and reputation are not independent of each other, but rather 
complement each other. The legal system’s reaction to misbehavior affects the market reaction.” 
(footnote omitted)). However, our legal tradition has a long-rooted faith in the role and importance 
of the court of public opinion serving as a disciplining mechanism for the conduct of participants 
in the courts of the law. According to Jeremy Bentham, publicity encourages witnesses to be 
truthful in their courtroom testimony. BENTHAM, supra note 15, at 115 (“Environed as he sees 
himself by a thousand eyes, contradiction, should he hazard a false tale, will seem ready to rise up 
in opposition to it from a thousand mouths.”); see also Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of 
Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 119, 127–29 (2012) (describing the disciplining effect of 
publicity on jurors). Publicity also disciplines those holding high judicial office and serves as 
society’s primary form of security against abuses of government power. See BENTHAM, supra note 
15, at 115 (“[Publicity] keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”); see also Gerald J. 
Postema, The Soul of Law, in BENTHAM’S THEORY OF LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION 46–48 (Xiaobo Zhai 
& Michael Quinn eds., 2014) (discussing the ways that publicity ensures public oversight over 
government actors); Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and 
Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1, 15–24 (2011) (explaining how Bentham thought 
publicity facilitated accountability). In Bentham’s view, the “primary leverage” used by the public 
to ensure accountability of government actors was “manipulation of reputation or esteem. Public 
condemnation threatened an official’s reputation.” Postema, supra, at 52; see also Lobel, supra 
note 8, at 487–89 (“ ‘[L]itigation is one of the most effective ways to win publicity for a cause.’ 
Public interest litigators and organizations have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting 
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For decades, public interest lawyers heeded Bentham’s insight 
by harnessing the publicity effects of litigation to pressure powerful 
social actors to change.20 But this exposition of public relations 
litigation leads to an incomplete picture of the phenomena because it 
generally focuses on plaintiffs litigating for primarily public benefit. 
Society is therefore more likely to perceive public relations litigation as 
socially beneficial. What is missing—and what this Article offers—is a 
better understanding of how these strategies are employed at the other 
 
the media. . . . Often, litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing else does.” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 58 (1994))). Bentham acknowledges that exercise of the Public 
Opinion Tribunal’s functions is dependent on news media:  
They are the real force by which information—including reports of government 
activities, proceedings of the legislature, and opinions (“suffrages”) of the people—is 
collected, sifted through, and publicized in an accessible form. . . . The claimant and 
accused provide statements, correspondents to the editor provide evidence as witnesses, 
and then the editor essentially writes an editorial on the subject. After this debate-trial 
has run its course, the judgment of public opinion is converted into action, but only 
indirectly . . . . 
Cutler, supra note 17, at 330–31.  
 20. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: THEORY OF LAW 
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 214 (1978) (explaining how social reform groups used legal 
proceedings to create unfavorable publicity that forced parties into settlement); Emily Chiang, 
Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 59–61 (2015) (describing similar 
strategies); Lobel, supra note 8, at 489; Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical 
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 959–62 (2007) 
(discussing effects of litigation on social mobilization); Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through 
Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing the benefits to social movements from losing 
litigation battles).  
 One notable historical example is the Scopes Trial. See Perry Parks, Summer for the Scientists? 
The Scopes Trial and the Pedagogy of Journalism, 92 JOURNALISM MASS COMM. Q. 444, 444–45 
(2015) (examining how the press contributed to educating the public about evolution during the 
Scopes Trial). The trial was also important because it attracted “up to two hundred reporters and 
included the first live radio broadcast from a courtroom.” Id. at 445. The media framed the trial 
using narratives that were sure to get people’s attention, such as portraying it “as a clash of 
multiple values—religion versus science, urban enlightenment versus rural ignorance, Northern 
freethinking versus Southern fundamentalism.” Id. 
 For contemporary examples, consider Colorado River Ecosystem v. Colorado, in which the 
plaintiff, the Colorado River Ecosystem, requested that a federal court recognize and declare that 
it “is capable of possessing rights similar to a ‘person’ ” and therefore has rights “to exist, flourish, 
regenerate, naturally evolve, and be restored.” Amended Complaint For Declaratory & Injunctive 
Relief at 3, Colo. River Ecosystem v. Colorado, No.1:17-cv-02316 (D. Colo. dismissed Dec. 4, 2017), 
http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-docu 
ments/2017/20171106_docket-117-cv-02316_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8RP-BGTD].  
 Similarly, Naruto v. Slater (the “Monkey Selfie” case), concerned whether nonhumans (such as 
monkeys) could have intellectual property rights under the law. 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018). 
According to People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”), this case was important 
because it “sparked a massive international discussion about the need to extend fundamental 
rights to animals for their own sake—not in relation to the ways in which they can be exploited by 
humans.” Zachary Toliver, Settlement Reached: ‘Monkey Selfie’ Case Broke New Ground for Animal 
Rights, PETA (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.peta.org/blog/settlement-reached-monkey-selfie-case-
broke-new-ground-animal-rights [https://perma.cc/8W52-BU9C].  
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end of the spectrum: for-profit parties using the litigation stage for 
primarily private benefits. These parties are two sides of the same coin; 
both types use litigation as a stage to reach particular audiences, albeit 
different ones.  
This Article offers a framework for understanding how litigation 
can help manage reputation in yet another arena for public relations: 
post-crisis situations that occur in the wake of a financial scandal, data 
breach, product accident, or other reputational crisis. Litigation often 
occurs in such situations, but it responds not only to the actual injuries 
that such incidents may cause but also to the information vacuum these 
incidents create and the reputational consequences that result if the 
vacuum is allowed to grow.21 This Article offers a framework for 
understanding when we might expect to witness the reputational 
effects of post-crisis litigation. It explains that reputational effects 
depend on both proximity and organizational similarity between the 
parties. Depending on these factors, post-crisis litigation can help 
businesses “in the hot seat” achieve both economic and reputational 
objectives. 
The framework that this Article offers has descriptive, practical, 
and normative implications. Descriptively, it helps to better understand 
litigant benefits that flow from lawsuits. The public generally assumes 
that parties initiate litigation to receive rewards—usually financial—
from a court in response to a legal harm incurred.22 Litigant conduct 
becomes more difficult to explain in cases when parties are unlikely to 
win.23 This Article explains how the court of public opinion matters for 
understanding litigant behavior and how ignoring it results in an 
incomplete picture of litigation.  
Practically, this analysis illustrates the disparity in timing 
between the filing of reputational lawsuits and the law’s tools for 
 
 21. See Craig Deegan, The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures—A 
Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 296 (2002) (discussing the 
strategic use of information disclosure by corporations in the wake of crises to reestablish 
legitimacy); David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social 
Reporting: Implementing a Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 5, 8 (2007) (“[R]esearchers using legitimacy theory hypothesize that firms report information 
only when needed to maintain or repair their legitimacy within the community. Greater 
stakeholder awareness of any particular firm’s negative social performance leads to the need for 
that firm to engage in legitimacy maintenance activities, which include disclosure.”). 
 22. See Robert G. Bone, Economics of Civil Procedure, in 3 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 148 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (“In this model, parties make litigation choices that 
maximize their expected value.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Klement, Negative-Expected-Value Suits, in 
PROCEDURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 341 (Chris Sanchirico ed., 2d ed. 2012) (outlining potential 
theories as to why litigants pursue suits that they will likely lose); D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A 
Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). 
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dismissing them (or otherwise discouraging them). Many business 
litigants hit their reputational mark upon filing the lawsuit; dismissals 
do not undermine that reputational victory. While a dismissal can 
protect a defendant from a frivolous lawsuit in a court of law, it does 
not similarly protect the defendant from harm in the court of public 
opinion. This insight is important because strategies designed to reduce 
unwanted lawsuits will fail if they do not account for litigant incentives 
that originate from public opinion. Normatively, this Article challenges 
us to consider the relationship between the “two courts” of law and 
public opinion and encourages us to identify the reputational 
dimensions of everyday litigation. 
Part I explains how reputation provides the value in a lawsuit 
and illustrates this explanation with various examples where corporate 
plaintiffs benefit from the reputational effects of litigation. Part II 
builds on these examples with an in-depth study of how post-crisis 
litigation can address reputational damage for business litigants. This 
Part first provides a theoretical framework for understanding when 
reputational effects should be expected and then introduces two 
illustrative examples that demonstrate this framework. Part III 
investigates three reasons why litigation creates reputational effects: 
relationship to media, information environments, and aggregation. 
Finally, Part IV explores the types of reputational gains that litigation 
can produce and the limitations of current legal rules for discouraging 
public relations litigation deemed socially undesirable. 
I. REPUTATION BUILDING THROUGH LITIGATION: SIGNALING  
Assuming that businesses act rationally, we can expect them to 
engage in litigation when they obtain, or expect to obtain, positive value 
from a lawsuit.24 Because this discussion focuses on business parties, 
this value is understood as financial gain—although individual 
plaintiffs do file lawsuits for a variety of nonfinancial reasons.25 If this 
 
 24. Bone, supra note 22, at 148. One explanation for where this value originates is 
settlements. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Klement, supra note 23; William H.J. Hubbard, Sinking Costs to 
Force or Deter Settlement, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 545, 548–53 (2016); Rosenberg & Shavell, supra 
note 23. 
 25. See, e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 98 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“[T]ort offered Mitchell the 
same thing that revenge did. It offered him a way of countering the message that Alcorn’s spit 
sent, a way of correcting the historical significance of Alcorn’s wrong.”); Larissa Katz, Spite and 
Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1456–59 
(2013) (surveying cases that were motivated by animus); see also Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic 
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (2011) (describing “strategic spillovers” as situations 
where “parties . . . employ externalities opportunistically as a type of extortion”). 
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financial gain does not come from the courtroom, then it must come 
from outside of it.  
This Part explains how reputational effects may provide the 
missing value in a lawsuit that otherwise appears to lack it.26 When 
business litigants do not obtain financial benefits from a judicial 
remedy or settlement, they may still obtain important reputational 
gains through the publicity around a lawsuit. These reputational gains 
can lead to indirect financial benefits for a business litigant by affecting 
its competitiveness in the marketplace. Specifically, information from 
litigation can reach particular audiences that are important to a 
corporation’s success: employees, competitors, consumers, civil society, 
investors, and future contracting partners. These lawsuits have the 
potential to influence the reputation of the business litigant in the eyes 
of these actors, thereby affecting their decisions to interact with the 
business. It is these reputational effects—and the financial benefits 
that may result—that supply the otherwise absent positive value to 
some puzzling lawsuits. This Part begins with a brief introduction to 
corporate reputation and then provides examples of how different types 
of lawsuits can help business litigants, particularly plaintiffs, achieve 
reputational gains even if they lose in court.  
A. Reputation as a Strategic Asset 
 According to reputation expert Charles Fombrun, a “corporate 
reputation is a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions 
and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all of its 
key constituents when compared with leading rivals.”27 A corporation’s 
key constituents include not only consumers but also investors, 
employees, and communities.28 A corporation can rise or fall based on 
 
 26. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–5) (describing how the reputational 
effects of predatory patent litigation compensate for an otherwise unprofitable lawsuit).  
 27. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE 72 
(1996); see also David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of 
Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000) (“A firm’s 
reputation is produced by the interactions of the firm with its stakeholders and by information 
about the firm and its actions circulated among stakeholders, including specialized information 
intermediaries.”); Yuri Mishina, Emily S. Block & Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of 
Organizational Reputation: How Social Judgment Influences Assessments of Capability & 
Character, 33 STRAT. MGMT. J. 459, 460 (2012) (“Organizational reputation is defined as the 
collective, stakeholder group-specific assessment regarding an organization’s capability to create 
value based on its characteristics and qualities.” (citations omitted)); Robert C. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693–95 
(1986) (discussing reputation as property). 
 28. FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 61. 
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what these different actors think of it.29 This is because these actors 
provide a corporation with something it needs in order to succeed: 
consumers provide revenue, investors provide capital, employees 
provide talent, and communities provide the social license to operate. A 
corporate reputation influences these actors’ decisions to provide or 
withhold their resources; therefore, reputation has important 
competitive consequences.  
Corporate reputations are important to consumers because a 
reputation might be the only information a consumer has about a 
corporation before the consumer purchases a good or service from it.30 
Prospective employees also care about corporate reputations because 
they want to know whether a corporate employer will treat them well 
and reward their work.31 Prospective suppliers care about whether a 
corporation will fulfill its contractual obligations in good faith.32 And 
corporations depend on relationships with local communities and 
government actors.33  
While reputations are important, they are not self-created; a 
reputation is a product of what others think.34 A person or corporation 
 
 29. Id. at 81 (“Corporate reputations have bottom-line effects. A good reputation enhances 
profitability because it attracts customers to the company’s products, investors to its securities, 
and employees to its jobs. In turn, esteem inflates the price at which a public company’s securities 
trade.”).  
 30. Michael L. Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate Reputation: Managing 
Reputational Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 4 (2008); Morten Thanning Vendelø, 
Narrating Corporate Reputation: Becoming Legitimate Through Storytelling, 28 INT’L STUD. 
MGMT. & ORG. 120, 120 (1998); see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note 21, at 17 (explaining 
information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders).  
 31. See John Dodge, The War for Tech Talent Escalates, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/02/19/the-war-for-tech-talent-escalates/ejUSbuPCjP 
LCMRYlRZIKoJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/2U5A-88P2] (describing the fierce competition for 
software engineers and other employees in Massachusetts’s tech industry).  
 32. Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in 
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 606 (2015) (“[E]ven firms as powerful as Apple 
are deeply concerned about their reputation for treating suppliers fairly.”).  
 33. See, e.g., Nicholas Bariyo & Jacquie McNish, Tanzania’s Tougher Mining Laws Rattle 
Companies, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tanzanias-tougher-mining-
laws-rattles-companies-1501666200 [https://perma.cc/C2YV-KSEA] (reporting that mining 
companies in Tanzania confront increasing pressure from the government, including export bans; 
restrictions on foreign travel; and demands for billions of dollars in back taxes, penalties, and 
interest); Tsvetana Paraskova, Nigerian Protesters Storm Shell Crude Oil Flow Station, 
OILPRICE.COM (Aug. 11, 2017), https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Nigerian-
Protesters-Storm-Shell-Crude-Oil-Flow-Station.html [https://perma.cc/Q9KS-XBJ8] (describing 
how hundreds of protesters attacked a Shell-owned crude flow station, “protesting against lack of 
jobs, demanding infrastructure development, . . . asking for an end to oil pollution in the Niger 
Delta[,] and claim[ing] that they were not benefiting from the oil-rich resources in the restive 
area”).  
 34. FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 59; E. Geoffrey Love & Matthew Kraatz, Character, 
Conformity, or the Bottom Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected Corporate Reputation, 52 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 314, 314 (2009) (“Corporate reputation is an important asset (or liability) bestowed 
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can influence its own reputation but cannot author it.35 Instead, a 
corporation shapes its reputation by affecting the views of others 
concerning itself.   
B. Discouraging Rivals: Signals to New Entrants 
Paul Milgrom and John Roberts investigated the threat of 
predation by incumbent firms against new entrants and explained that 
predation is profitable even if it does not result in immediate exit by a 
rival because acts of predation provide an incumbent with a reputation 
for predation that can discourage entry into the market by new firms.36 
It is this reputation that is valuable because it “leads potential entrants 
to anticipate that the incumbent firm will behave similarly if they 
should enter, and, thus, entry appears less attractive to them.”37 
Potential entrants rely on an incumbent’s reputation for predation 
when evaluating entry because they suffer from information 
asymmetries and are “unsure about one another’s options or 
motivation.”38 Therefore, new entrants predict future behavior on the 
basis of past conduct;39 an observable record of predation by the market 
incumbent against previous entrants suggests to new entrants that 
they would encounter a similar response. 
Milgrom and Roberts’s explanation of reputation building 
through signaling is useful for understanding certain litigation 
strategies that similarly depend on reputational effects. For example, a 
plaintiff corporation may use a lawsuit to discourage competition from 
a market rival. In 2015, Gillette brought a lawsuit against four former 
employees who Gillette claimed had misappropriated its trade secrets 
to develop products for ShaveLogic (also a defendant).40 In response, 
 
upon a firm by external audiences.” (citation omitted)); Stelios Zyglidopoulos & Nelson Phillips, 
Responding to Reputational Crises: A Stakeholder Perspective, 2 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 333, 335 
(1999) (“Reputation is, therefore, fundamentally a stakeholder-based concept; it grows out of a 
stakeholder relationship and it is shaped, if not determined, by that relationship.”); see also Post, 
supra note 27, at 692 (“The dictionary describes [reputation] as the ‘common or general estimate 
of a person with respect to character or other qualities.’ Reputation thus inheres in the social 
apprehension that we have of each other.” (footnote omitted)). 
 35. See, e.g., Parella, supra note 13, at 930–55 (discussing reputational sanctions for 
organizational defendants). 
 36. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 14, at 281, 284. 
 37. Id. at 281 (“[P]redation will emerge in our model even if . . . predation against a particular 
rival involves losses that cannot be directly recouped in the given market, even were exit to be 
induced. Moreover, viability of this predatory strategy does not depend on being able to induce 
exit.”).  
 38. Id. at 304. 
 39. Id. at 302. 
 40. Complaint at 1, Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 15-0149 B, 2015 WL 9911345 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Jan. 16, 2015), 2015 WL 216997. 
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ShaveLogic counterclaimed for intentional interference with 
prospective business relations, alleging that Gillette had threatened to 
file a lawsuit against ShaveLogic and did so knowing that the latter 
would have to disclose the fact of the lawsuit to its investors and future 
business partners.41 The counterclaim alleged that the fact of a lawsuit 
would affect these actors’ perceptions of ShaveLogic and influence their 
decision to collaborate with it.42 And ShaveLogic is not alone. The Wall 
Street Journal reported that “[t]he case is one of several Gillette has 
brought against rival razor companies as the brand cedes market share 
to upstarts offering cheaper blades and online delivery,” such as Dollar 
Shave Club and Edgewell (Schick-brand razors).43 Gillette asserted 
patent infringement claims against both competitors, who denied the 
allegations but later settled.44 
As the foregoing illustrates, businesses may engage in 
reputation building through signaling to reach audiences other than 
rivals. Litigation can serve reputation-building functions when the act 
of litigating allows a litigant to influence third-party views of itself or 
of a rival. These changed views provide reputational benefits when they 
influence the ways that the litigant or rival interacts with key 
stakeholders. 
C. Employees: Discouraging Flight by Employees 
Corporations also use litigation, frequently patent enforcement, 
to influence their reputations in a way that discourages employees from 
fleeing to competitors or starting their own businesses. A major 
component of a corporation’s competitive advantage is its employees, 
who bring valued skills and expertise to the corporation’s operations.45 
The problem is that such employees may leave. Exit is a double loss to 
a corporation: a departing employee reduces the skill and knowledge 
 
 41. Gillette Co., 2015 WL 9911345, at *1. 
 42. In its counterclaim against Gillette, ShaveLogic alleged that Gillette sent letters 
threatening litigation when it “knew that ShaveLogic was in discussion with marketing and 
distribution partners and with potential investors, and would have to disclose those threats as 
part of their discussions.” Id. ShaveLogic alleged that one marketing and distribution company 
“cut off discussions in November 2014 as soon as it learned of these litigation threats” and that 
“[a]t least one investor broke off discussions with ShaveLogic when these threats became known.” 
Id. at *3–4.  
43. Sharon Terlep, Gillette’s Lawsuit Against Razor Startup ShaveLogic Dismissed, WALL ST. 
J. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gillettes-lawsuit-against-razor-startup-shavelogic-
dismissed-1492803768 [https://perma.cc/DJ2F-G9UC]. 
 44. Id.; Barrett J. Brunsman, P&G Settles Lawsuit with Unilever’s Dollar Shave Club, CINN. 
BUS. COURIER (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2019/03/29/p-g-
settles-lawsuit-with-unilever-s-dollar-shave.html [https://perma.cc/2YET-FYGZ].  
 45. Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 659.  
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available to the business and the employee may bring it to a rival, 
thereby augmenting a competitor’s capacities. For example, as 
mentioned above, four former Gillette employees joined a competitor, 
ShaveLogic. 
In this context, management research suggests that some 
corporations cultivate a strong reputation for patent enforcement in 
order to retain high-value employees: “[B]y engaging in costly and 
observable litigious action, firms build reputations for being tough in 
safeguarding their intellectual property,” thereby reducing the value 
that employees expect to gain upon departure.46 As such, the patent 
enforcement concerns more than the parties to the case.47 This is 
especially true when the media, attracted to patent litigation, expands 
the audience for the litigation and the implicit messaging contained 
therein.48 The expense of patent litigation and the accompanying media 
coverage make it a costly and observable action that differentiates 
aggressive and passive employers.49 As a consequence, when “firms 
develop stronger reputations for litigiousness, employee-inventors 
become less likely to join or form rival companies.”50  
D. Investors and Civil Society: Responding to Online Defamation 
In the age of social media, we are all subject to the risk of 
unflattering views. Corporations are no different. Yelp, TripAdvisor, 
Amazon, and other platforms allow users to provide public but often 
anonymous reviews of a business’s performance; social media outlets, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, augment that power. With a few clicks 
(or taps, on a smartphone), an irate customer can publish negative 
comments, and the increasingly expansive social networks disseminate 
those comments to an increasingly expanding audience. Through these 
dynamics, a few clicks or taps can potentially threaten a business’s 
closely cultivated reputation.  
 
 46. See id. at 660, 679 (observing that “an employer’s aggressiveness in patent enforcement 
alters the antecedent proclivity of employees to exit”); see also Agarwal et al., supra note 4, at 1367 
(“[A] firm’s patent litigiousness significantly curtails the outward dissemination of technological 
knowledge that otherwise would be expected from employee departures.”). 
 47. Ganco et al., supra note 3, at 660 (“[W]e view patent enforcement as a reputation-building 
strategy rather than a particular tactic launched against a particular target.”).  
 48. Id. at 662. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. This strategy does not succeed with all employees. This same study found that “tough 
reputations are particularly influential in retaining employees whose ideas are valuable internally 
to the firm although those with the most lucrative prospects for outside advancement are relatively 
unaffected.” Id. 
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Litigation offers businesses one tool to manage their reputations 
in the wake of such public criticism.51 As part of a multifaceted public 
relations campaign, defamation lawsuits can aid corporate plaintiffs 
since “[c]orporations often issue press releases announcing their 
decision to sue those who post on financial bulletin boards, even though 
doing so gives more widespread publicity to the defendants’ remarks 
than they received at the time they were posted.”52 The “tendency to 
publicize the decision to file suit” is important for explaining why some 
defamation plaintiffs—who may never expect to win their cases—file 
suits nonetheless: 
The plaintiffs do not appear to see the result of their lawsuit, alone, as providing relief to 
their reputation. They know that victory is unlikely, and that the final decision is likely 
in any event to be ambiguous and distant. Instead, plaintiffs see the act of initiating suit, 
independent of its result, as an effective and public form of reply or response. By invoking 
the formal judicial system, the plaintiffs legitimize their claim of falsity. Reputational 
repair follows without the assistance of-indeed in spite of-the judicial system.53  
While this insight may be true for a broader range of defamation 
plaintiffs, the symbolic value of filing a defamation lawsuit is especially 
important to corporate plaintiffs who are sensitive to negative publicity 
that may affect their stock prices.54 As a result, “corporations must act 
quickly to offset the potentially negative effects of defamatory messages 
by offering an alternative version of events. Indeed, failure to respond 
may itself be deemed an admission that the negative statements are 
true.”55 As such, the existence of the lawsuit sends a message to a 
variety of audiences: investors (suggesting that the corporation is 
strong and stable, despite the reputational backlash), the public 
(refuting the defamatory comments), and even potential future critics 
(sending a warning by filing the lawsuit).56 The scholarship on 
 
 51. See Jessica Bartlett, Craft Beer Cellar Parent Sues Glassdoor over Negative Reviews, BOS. 
BUS. J. (May 22, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2018/05/22/craft-beer-cellar-
parent-sues-glassdoor-over.html [https://perma.cc/GLV5-52KZ] (“A craft beer retail chain is suing 
the employment website Glassdoor over negative comments and ratings on the site that the retail 
chain claims are defamatory.”); Beth Landman & Julia Marsh, Woman Hit with Defamation 
Lawsuit by Doctor over Negative Yelp Review, FOX NEWS (May 29, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/ 
health/woman-hit-with-defamation-lawsuit-by-doctor-over-negative-yelp-review [https://perma.cc 
/J67Q-HTR5] (“A Manhattan woman who gave one-star reviews on Yelp and ZocDoc to a Kips Bay 
gynecologist has spent nearly $20,000 defending herself against a defamation suit filed by the 
physician . . . .”).  
 52. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 876–77 (footnote omitted). 
 53. Bezanson, supra note 7, at 228. 
 54. See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 877 (“Corporate plaintiffs are at least partly motivated by 
the fear that negative statements on financial bulletin boards will drive down their stock price.”); 
Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1167, 
1168–69 (1995) (identifying various costs to corporations as a result of defamation).  
 55. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 877 (footnote omitted).  
 56. See id. at 880–81: 
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defamation suggests that these messages are still salient even if the 
prospects for litigation success are slim.57  
E. Future Licensees: Sending a Message 
 Finally, litigation can affect a business’s reputation with future 
licensees. In the patent context, PAEs file patent infringement lawsuits 
even over “bad patents” that “are likely invalid and ought not to have 
been granted in the first place.”58 These plaintiffs sue, despite the very 
low likelihood that they will profit from the lawsuit, in order to develop 
a reputation for litigiousness.59 This reputation matters because the 
targeted company’s decision to acquiesce to the PAE’s demands is 
influenced by the latter’s reputation to make good on its litigation 
threats, which the targeted company could observe from the PAE’s past 
litigation history.60 Therefore, developing a reputation for litigiousness 
is important to PAEs because it allows them to financially benefit from 
patents that may otherwise have been difficult or impossible to 
license.61 This strategy also alters the incentives a lawsuit offers a PAE; 
what is at stake in the lawsuit is not necessarily the merits of the 
dispute but the PAE’s reputation for litigiousness, because other 
 
Bringing suit sends a message to shareholders and potential investors that they should 
not believe all the negative information they hear about the company; it quells rumors 
and takes the focus away from the negative press the company has been receiving—
whether true or untrue. Even if the company ultimately decides not to pursue its action 
past filing a complaint, it may have won a symbolic victory simply by suing John Doe. 
 57. See Bezanson, supra note 7, at 228–29 (explaining that “the act of suit” sends out 
messages, regardless of the result of a lawsuit). 
 58. Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 2). 
 59. See id. (manuscript at 2–3) (“Despite being very experienced in patent litigation, many of 
the most litigious PAEs perform relatively poorly in court.”); id. (manuscript at 4) (“[S]ome of the 
most litigious PAEs are not dissuaded by the likelihood of losing or the possibility that their 
patents will be held invalid.”); id. (manuscript at 5) (“The PAE gains a strong reputation for 
aggressive litigation by following through on a litigation threat despite expecting to lose money on 
the suit.”).  
 60. See id. (manuscript at 3): 
They can give credibility to their threats by referencing previous situations in which 
they have litigated, and their targets can search through public records to discern how 
aggressively the PAE has litigated in the past. If the infringement claim is strong, then 
the PAE’s threat would be inherently credible. But if its patents are weak, it relies on 
evidence of aggressive litigation to give credibility to its threats. Once such credibility 
is established, the PAE can persuade its targets to accept demands they would 
otherwise reject.  
 61. Id. (manuscript at 2) (“Despite their legal expertise and substantial resources, some of 
the most active and litigious PAEs make their way by asserting bad patents, i.e. patents that are 
likely invalid and ought not to have been granted in the first place.”).  
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potential defendants observe this reputation of a propensity to litigate 
and react by acquiescing to the PAE’s licensing terms.62 
*      *      * 
The discussion above highlights three distinct lessons for 
understanding how business litigants, especially plaintiffs, derive value 
from litigation that may not succeed in court. First, the publicity around 
litigation can have reputation-enhancing effects for business litigants. 
Second, the audience for these reputational effects is not necessarily the 
opposing party in the lawsuit; instead, it can be a third-party actor, such 
as an investor, employee, or future contracting partner. The fact of the 
lawsuit and a business’s litigiousness are the messages that are 
directed at these audiences. Finally, these reputational effects can have 
real consequences for a business’s competitiveness in the marketplace 
by affecting its ability to retain employees, discourage competition, and 
assuage investors. It is these effects—and the financial benefits that 
may result from these effects—that help to explain the positive value of 
lawsuits that may otherwise fail in court. These effects and their 
reputational consequences are summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE 1: THE REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS OF BUSINESS LITIGATION 
Causes of 
Action Defendant 
Third-Party 
Audience 
Reputational 
Effect 
Competitive 
Effect 
Unfair Trade 
Practices  
New entrant 
New entrant’s 
potential 
business 
partners 
Discourages 
partnership 
with new 
entrant 
Impedes 
ability of new 
entrant to 
compete 
Patent 
litigation 
Former 
employees 
Current 
employees 
Reduces 
employees’ 
expected value 
upon 
departure 
Discourages 
employee 
flight 
Defamation  “John Doe” 
Investors and 
future critics 
Legitimizes 
claim of falsity 
Assuages 
investors and 
warns future 
critics 
Patent 
infringement 
Alleged 
infringers 
Future 
licensees 
PAE will 
litigate 
Monetizes 
“bad patents” 
 
 
 62. Id. (manuscript at 2–3). 
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II. REPUTATION BUILDING THROUGH LITIGATION: FRAMING 
The previous Part described how reputational gains provide 
value to business litigants even when those parties lose in court. This 
Part builds on this framework by explaining how litigation supplies 
reputational benefits in post-crisis situations. It is not surprising that 
litigation often follows in the wake of a corporate scandal; in some 
situations, however, lawsuits respond not only to economic harms but 
also to reputational problems. Section II.A provides a brief discussion 
of reputational harm following a crisis and the role of information in 
addressing it. Section II.B proposes a framework for understanding 
when we can expect particular reputational effects in post-crisis 
litigation. Section II.C then presents examples illustrating this 
framework. 
A. Information: Cause and Cure for Reputational Harm  
A good reputation is valuable but not permanent. Reputations 
change as consumers and other actors revise their opinions of a 
corporation based on new information.63 Unsurprisingly, reputations 
can plummet following a corporate scandal.64  
A crisis not only threatens the reputation of the corporation in 
crisis but can also threaten the reputation of its associates and peers 
because of a fundamental information problem: Following a corporate 
crisis, the public wants someone to blame. The problem is that it is not 
always clear who that party is. The public is not privy to the internal 
records, confidential communications, high-level meetings, or other 
sources of information that could reveal the identity of the blameworthy 
party. Therefore, the public tends to blame all parties involved.65  
 
 63. See FOMBRUN, supra note 27, at 59–61 (noting the difficulty that companies have in 
creating “enuring and resilient” reputations); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the 
Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1424 (2011) (“Reputational harm occurs when 
dissemination of information about an individual or entity causes others to form a collective 
judgment that has the potential to result in a change in relationship or attitude.”).  
 64. Tieying Yu & Richard H. Lester, Moving Beyond Firm Boundaries: A Social Network 
Perspective on Reputation Spillover, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 94, 95 (2008) (explaining that 
reputational crises emerge as a result of accidents, scandals, or financial problems).  
 65. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal 
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1763 (2006) (“A single act by a single firm can spark a 
constituent mobilization that destabilizes the taken-for-granted status of an entire industry.”); 
Michael L. Barnett & Andrew A. King, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Longitudinal 
Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1150, 1152 (2008) (“[W]hen 
new information is revealed about the characteristics of one firm, it reflects to some degree on all 
firms within its industry.”); Sheila Goins & Thomas S. Gruca, Understanding Competitive and 
Contagion Effects of Layoff Announcements, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 12, 30 (2008) 
(“[I]nformation from the actions of one firm sends signals that shareholders incorporate into their 
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Consider the recent example of Facebook and Cambridge 
Analytica. In 2018, the public learned that Cambridge Analytica 
obtained access to private information for more than fifty million 
Facebook users.66 Uproar ensued as users, regulators, and citizens 
demanded to know what had happened and who was responsible.67 But 
placing blame was not simple given that three actors were involved: the 
data was accessed by Cambridge Analytica; the application was 
developed by a Cambridge University professor, Aleksandr Kogan; and 
the information was collected from Facebook.68 Each denied wrongdoing 
and blamed the others. However, this scandal engulfed all three actors 
and levied significant reputational consequences against each.69 
Reputational harm can also spread to industry peers. In these 
instances, reputational harm does not spread based on proximity or 
contacts but on perceived organizational similarity. Industry peers may 
potentially suffer reputational harm as the public wonders whether the 
behavior underlying the crisis is an isolated incident or reveals broader 
 
valuations of other companies.”); Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8 (2015) (“[S]takeholders are asymmetrically informed about the inner workings 
of the company.”); Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 94–95 (explaining “reputational spill-over”); Lori 
Qingyuan Yue & Paul Ingram, Industry Self-Regulation as a Solution to the Reputation Commons 
Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 279 (Michael L. Barnett & 
Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012) (“[R]eputations are ‘intangible commons’ because organizations 
share both the penalties and rewards associated with the reputation of their industries.”). 
66. Issie Lapowsky, Facebook Exposed 87 Million Users to Cambridge Analytica, WIRED (Apr. 
4, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-exposed-87-million-users-to-cambridge-analytica 
[https://perma.cc/P4EM-SG8B].  
67.  Tony Romm & Elizabeth Dwoskin, U.S. Regulators Have Met To Discuss Imposing a 
Record-setting Fine Against Facebook for Privacy Violations, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/18/us-regulators-have-met-discuss-imposing 
-record-setting-fine-against-facebook-some-its-privacy-violations [https://perma.cc/3MBR-TGXP]. 
68. Lesley Stahl, Aleksandr Kogan: The Link Between Cambridge Analytic and Facebook, 60 
MINUTES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/aleksandr-kogan-the-link-between-
cambridge-analytica-and-facebook-60-minutes/ [https://perma.cc/AQ9L-TZFC]. 
 69. For example, Cambridge Analytica filed for bankruptcy following the crisis. Abinaya 
Vijayaraghavan & Supantha Mukherjee, Cambridge Analytica Files for Bankruptcy in U.S. 
Following Facebook Debacle, REUTERS (May 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cambridge-analytica-bankruptcy/cambridge-analytica-files-for-bankruptcy-in-u-s-following-face 
book-debacle-idUSKCN1IJ0IS [https://perma.cc/6AB7-5XUJ]. Mark Zuckerberg faced government 
hearings on both sides of the Atlantic, and Facebook is the subject of multiple lawsuits brought by 
investors, users, and state regulators. See Jeff John Roberts, Facebook Has Been Hit By Dozens of 
Data Lawsuits. And This Could Be Just the Beginning, FORTUNE (Apr. 30, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/04/30/facebook-data-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/5UJP-SBED] (“Facebook 
is facing more than three dozen class action lawsuits over Cambridge Analytica.”); Vijayaraghavan 
& Mukherjee, supra (stating that both United States congressional committees and the European 
Parliament have requested that Mark Zuckerberg testify). Finally, Aleksandr Kogan claims that 
all these actors are using him as a scapegoat in the public eye. Matthew Weaver, Facebook 
Scandal: I Am Being Used as Scapegoat, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/mar/21/facebook-row-i-am-being-used-as-scapegoat-
says-academic-aleksandr-kogan-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/PPP2-6UXY].  
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problems within the industry.70 In other words, is the company under 
scrutiny “the one bad apple in the basket,” or “is the whole basket 
rotten”?71  
But information is not only a source of reputational harm, it is 
also a potential cure. Reputational harm spreads to multiple actors 
when the public lacks information concerning the facts of the crisis, 
such as what happened, why it happened, who was responsible, and 
whether it can happen again. Therefore, one way to contain 
reputational harm is to supply information concerning these questions, 
often through a press release.  
A press release is a type of communication “in which writers 
provide information to journalists in the hope that it will be passed on 
to the general public.”72 It is more likely that a journalist will pick up a 
press release when crisis managers draft their releases to meet the 
formal requirements of news reporting.73 For example, authors of press 
 
 70. See Barnett & Hoffman, supra note 30, at 4 (emphasizing that a firm’s reputation depends 
on the actions and reputations of other firms); Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 98 (“Since 
determining the impact of a reputational crisis requires accurate information, in situations of 
ambiguity stakeholders might find it difficult to differentiate between individual organizations, 
thereby penalizing all organizations that are either proximate or equivalent to the focal 
organization equally.”).  
 71. The Cambridge-Facebook scandal also illustrates the risk of reputational harm between 
industry peers, especially regulatory reputational risk. For example, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee not only invited Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to testify, it also extended invitations 
to the CEOs of Twitter and Google. See Press Release, Office of Senator Chuck Grassley, Chairman 
Grassley Announces Hearing on the Future of Data Privacy in Social Media (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/chairman-grassley-announces-hearing-futur 
e-data-privacy-social-media [https://perma.cc/5B8E-6689]. Not only were industry peers dragged 
into the spotlight concerning their own practices but they also share the risk that this crisis could 
spark future regulation on data privacy. Christopher Mims, Apple, Amazon and Google Also Are 
Bracing for Privacy Regulations, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-
amazon-and-google-also-are-bracing-for-privacy-regulations-1523188801 [https://perma.cc/W7YX-
VGLV] (“U.S. technology companies have stayed largely exempt from significant government 
regulation and self-policing of privacy, but that is about to change.”). Not all reputational damage 
is negative for peers. For example, Tim Cook used the crisis to distinguish Apple (its purpose, 
structure, and products) from Facebook and similar organizations: “The truth is we could make a 
ton of money if we monetized our customer, if our customer was our product. We’ve elected not to 
do that.” Ariana Brockington, Apple’s Tim Cook Slams Facebook: Privacy ‘Is a Human Right,’  
‘A Civil Liberty,’ VARIETY (Mar. 28, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/tim-cook- 
slams-facebook-privacy-1202738726 [https://perma.cc/7FG4-PFA]. By drawing attention to 
organizational differences between the two companies, Cook takes aim at Zuckerberg, Facebook, 
and other companies that “monetize” customers. See id. 
 72. Henk Pander Maat, How Promotional Language in Press Releases Is Dealt with by 
Journalists: Genre Mixing or Genre Conflict?, 44 J. BUS. COMM. 59, 60 (2007). 
 73. See GEERT JACOBS, PREFORMULATING THE NEWS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE METAPRAGMATICS 
OF PRESS RELEASES 122 (1999) (stating that press releases that meet the formal requirements of 
news reporting have a greater chance of being publicized by the media); Maat, supra note 72, at 
61 (“To maximize the chance of a press release being journalistically appropriated and to exert the 
utmost control on how they are used, press release writers try to meet the formal requirements of 
news reporting.”). 
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releases avoid self-reference through the first person and adopt the 
third person in order to distance themselves from the information they 
provide.74 This strategy is complete if and when a journalist picks up 
the press release because “news reports based on press releases avoid 
mentioning their primary source.”75 Despite the appearance of 
objectivity, “organizations can be seen to smuggle in positive 
characterizations of their activities in seemingly innocuous third-
person references.”76 Employing strategies such as these improves not 
only the chances that a journalist will pick up the press release but also 
that the journalist will edit it only minimally. As a result, the crisis 
manager remains master of the narrative, supplying the information 
the manager prefers.77 
B. Framing Through Litigation 
It is not only press releases that supply information to the public 
following a crisis. Post-crisis litigation addresses the economic harms 
that the parties suffered from the crisis and additionally helps address 
the information vacuum surrounding it—a vacuum that can threaten 
the reputation of the parties involved if it is allowed to grow. Litigation 
documents supply information that can help control reputational harm. 
Lawyers do not need to change their style of writing to increase traction 
with journalists; instead, the way lawyers write already improves the 
odds of traction. Lawyers draft litigation documents in the third person, 
usually adopting the formal name of the organization concerned. This 
convention aligns with the norms of formal news reporting and provides 
the legal documents with a greater level of objectivity and authority. 
This perception of objectivity is enhanced by legal norms that present 
advocacy arguments in a clear, objective, and largely impersonal 
manner that disguises self-promotion. These characteristics accord 
with the “preformulation” techniques used by crisis managers when 
they draft press releases to improve the chances that a journalist will 
 
 74. See JACOBS, supra note 73, at 123 (claiming that authors of press releases use third-
person to make the press releases “look disinterested and neutral rather than self-interested, 
promotional”). By using the third-person voice, “writers of press releases seem to anticipate the 
typical reference forms of news reporting and . . . in doing so, they allow journalists to simply copy 
the press releases.” Id. at 113. Additionally, the third-party voice disguises the source of the 
information and makes the information appear more credible and objective because it seems less 
self-promotional. Id. at 124 (“[W]riters of press releases indeed want to ‘hide their relationship to 
the information they provide’ . . . .”). 
 75. Maat, supra note 72, at 61. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See JACOBS, supra note 73, at 113–14 (discussing preformulation).  
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pick up the release and copy it verbatim.78 Additionally, litigation 
attracts media attention because litigation documents are more 
credible, provide context for events, and may provide sources that 
journalists may not otherwise obtain.79 
But just because litigation documents can create reputational 
benefits does not mean they always will. When might we expect to 
witness reputational framing in post-crisis litigation? One way to 
understand these effects is with reference to proximity and 
organizational similarity.  
Figure 1 and the discussion that follows illustrate the effect 
these factors have on expected reputational benefits. The innermost 
zone presented in Figure 1 represents the focal corporation; here, the 
reputational harm is most acute. The outer zones represent possible 
patterns of reputational harm that can spread from the focal 
corporation to its associates or peers. Reputational harm dissipates 
with proximity, so lower levels of reputational harm would be expected 
in Zone Three (low proximity) compared to Zone Two (high proximity).80  
 
 78. Id. 
79. See infra notes 147–154 and accompanying text.  
 80. According to communications scholars, one of the most important factors influencing 
reputational harm is proximity to the focal organization. See Yu & Lester, supra note 64, at 95 
(explaining that reputational harm is also affected by high network centrality, composition of the 
industry network, and reputation of the recipient organization). Proximity is based on direct 
contacts between two organizations so that “[t]he closer the relational contact, the more likely that 
the change in one organization’s disposition will affect the other.” Id. at 99 (“[D]irect contacts drive 
organizations to closely resemble one another, which in turn evokes a similar schema for 
stakeholders to interpret their true characteristics after a reputational crisis occurs. Therefore a 
reputational crisis is more likely to spread to an industry participant which has direct contacts 
with the focal organization.”). Stakeholders can still bundle two firms together even if those firms 
do not share direct contacts but instead share “structural equivalence” or “perceived similarity in 
their core attributes,” such as mission, similar organizational structure, or core technology. Id. 
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FIGURE 1: POST-CRISIS REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS 
 
 
Zone One (Intraorganizational Harm). The corporation 
most at risk from a crisis is the focal corporation, or the “one in the hot 
seat.” Consider, for example, Acme Corporation, a company that makes 
high-tech widgets. Investigative journalism reveals that Acme Plant, a 
subsidiary of Acme Corporation, polluted local waterways with extreme 
levels of deadly toxins, leading to the deaths of dozens. The resulting 
reputational crisis is not limited to Acme Plant but attaches to the Acme 
name generally and in turn affects other units that also share the Acme 
name. 
 If Acme Corporation brings a lawsuit against one of its 
subsidiaries, it runs the risk of “reputational backfiring”: Acme 
Corporation and the Acme Plant in Missouri are not organizationally 
distinct enough to prevent the risk that any finger pointing at Acme 
Plant through litigation may cause reputational damage to Acme 
Corporation because the public cannot sufficiently distinguish between 
the two. This is the risk of organizational confusion. Therefore, while 
reputational risk is highest for the focal corporation, we may be less 
likely to witness public relations benefits of litigation in situations of 
intraorganizational reputational harm when the reputational harm of 
litigation can attach to both parties. 
There is one exception: if a third-party actor has already 
initiated action (for example, investigation or litigation) against Acme 
Plant, then Acme Corporation may be more likely to benefit from the 
public relations effects of litigation because that third party has already 
publicly differentiated between the two. By instigating action against 
Acme Plant, the third party has opened the “black box” of Acme and 
Zone One: 
Intraorganizational 
Harm
Zone Two: 
Interorganizational 
Harm (High 
Proximity)
Zone Three: 
Interorganizational 
Harm (Low 
Proximity)
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focused attention (including negative publicity) on the Acme subsidiary. 
Once this distinction has been made in the public mind, Acme 
Corporation may face less of a risk of organizational confusion if it 
engages in public relations litigation against Acme Plant.  
Zone Two (Interorganizational Harm, High Proximity). A 
business located in Zone Two is one that is in high proximity to the focal 
corporation. Reputational risk to this business may not be as great as 
to the focal corporation, but the business may nonetheless suffer 
damaging reputational harm because of the focal corporation’s crisis. 
Unlike the focal corporation, however, the proximate business may 
benefit from the public relations effects of litigation that poses a lower 
risk of organizational confusion because this business is 
organizationally distinct from the focal one. For example, suppose that 
Acme Plant makes widgets for a new line of self-driving cars 
manufactured by Auto Corporation. If the public learns of the 
connection, then the reputational fallout from the crisis involving Acme 
Plant can spread to Auto Corporation. However, Acme and Auto are 
organizationally distinct: they are separate companies, they do not 
share the same name, they make different products and compete in 
different markets, and they only have a buyer-supplier relationship. 
These organizational differences create space between the two 
corporations. While the supply relationship increases the risk of 
reputational harm spreading from one corporation to the other, the 
organizational differences between the two reduces the risk that 
reputational damage resulting from the lawsuit that is suffered by 
Acme will attach to Auto Corporation. 
Zone Three (Interorganizational Harm, Low Proximity). 
Corporations in Zone Three are also organizationally distinct from the 
focal corporation, but with low proximity to the latter. As a result, the 
risk of reputational harm from the crisis is also low, so there is less 
likelihood that a corporation in this zone may benefit from reputational 
effects of public relations litigation. 
In summary, we are more likely to witness reputational benefits 
for plaintiffs in post-crisis public relations litigation in Zone Two where 
the plaintiff corporation is at high risk for reputational harm but at low 
risk of organizational confusion. We may also expect similar 
reputational benefits for public relations litigation in Zone One when a 
third party has already initiated an investigation or litigation into one 
or more actors within the focal corporation.  
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C. Illustrative Examples 
The previous Section provided a framework for understanding 
when we might expect to witness reputational benefits of post-crisis 
litigation for business litigants. This Section illustrates this framework 
with two recent examples. First, we may expect reputational benefits in 
litigation that occurs contemporaneously with a proxy fight.81 Here, 
litigation between management and shareholders supplies information 
to the media concerning each side, and this information, in turn, may 
influence shareholder perceptions and votes.82 Second, we may expect 
to see public relations effects in post-crisis litigation where two 
associated businesses are embroiled in a public relations crisis. Here, 
one side may use litigation to disseminate information to the media 
(and the public) regarding what happened, why it happened, and who 
was ultimately responsible. This information is significant in a crisis 
situation because it affects the extent of reputational damage a 
business may suffer in the wake of the crisis.  
1. Zone One—Intraorganizational Reputational Harm: 
Public Relations in Proxy Fights 
While reputations are important during proxy fights,83 they are 
not given. Instead, reputations are constructed from the information 
available to a shareholder concerning each side. Consequently, each 
 
 81. See Steven Haas & Charles Brewer, Dissident’s Disclosure Lawsuit Leads to ISS 
Recommendation Change, DEAL LAWYERS, Sept.-Oct. 2017, at 7, 7–8 (explaining how in a recent 
proxy fight, “dissident’s offensive disclosure litigation caused ISS to reevaluate—and ultimately 
withdraw—its support for the executive chairman,” thereby demonstrating “how a dissident can 
use offensive litigation strategically to bolster the dissident’s arguments and influence 
stockholders and proxy advisors”); T. Ray Guy, The Trial of the Hidden Agenda: Part I, A.B.A. 
CORP. COUNSEL (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/trial_hidden_agenda.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C555-PUX3] (explaining the public relations effects of a lawsuit filed by a hedge 
fund in the Delaware Court of Chancery under Section 220, including (a) a lengthy demand letter 
replete with “lurid allegations” against the company that was publicized and filed as an 
attachment with the SEC, “where [it] could easily and immediately be accessed online and read by 
other voting stockholders,” and (b) the hedge fund’s attachment of its complaint to a press release 
it issued after filing the lawsuit).  
 82. See Guy, supra note 81 (“[A]llegations of corporate misconduct that were superfluous to 
a legitimate request for information were undeniably germane to an indirect communication to 
shareholders . . . .”). 
 83. See Proxy Contest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (10th ed. 2014) (“A struggle between 
two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted shareholders.”); Proxy Fight, BARRON’S 
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 585 (9th ed. 2014) (“[A] technique used by an 
acquiring company to attempt to gain control of a takeover target. The acquirer tries to persuade 
shareholders of the target company that the present management of the firm should be ousted in 
favor of a slate of directors favorable to the acquirer.”). 
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side in a proxy fight will invest significant resources in influencing the 
information that shareholders receive about it and its opponent.84 
But not all information wars in proxy battles occur directly. Each 
side also influences its reputation (and the reputation of its opponent) 
through information it disseminates to intermediaries, such as the 
financial media, which in turn disseminate information to 
shareholders.85 Lawsuits during a proxy fight between a company and 
activist investors also provide information that the financial and news 
media disseminate to the public in general and shareholders in 
particular.  
For example, consider the litigation between Dov Charney and 
American Apparel’s board of directors following the latter’s termination 
of the former. In June 2014, the board suspended Charney from his 
positions as President and CEO, notifying him (and the public) that 
they intended to terminate him “for cause.”86 The lawsuits that followed 
the termination are important because the litigation documents 
provided information to the media that it used to develop and 
disseminate competing narratives explaining Charney’s termination.87  
 
 84. For example, in the largest proxy fight in U.S. history, Proctor & Gamble and activist 
investor Nelson Peltz spent an estimated $100 million collectively on “mailings, phone calls  
and advertisements to woo investors.” Siddharth Cavale, P&G Appoints Peltz to Board Despite  
Losing Proxy Battle, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-procter-gamble-
trian/pg-appoints-peltz-to-board-despite-losing-proxy-battle-idUSKBN1E92ZA [https://perma.cc/ 
Q79D-NNE4].  
 85. See Matthew W. Ragas, Agenda Building During Activist Shareholder Campaigns, 39 
PUB. REL. REV. 219, 219 (2013) (“Investors turn to information intermediaries such as the financial 
news media to assist them in making investment decisions. Therefore, companies and their 
stakeholders, particularly activist shareholders, devote significant resources to trying to shape 
financial media coverage to their advantage.” (citations omitted)); Kate Sylvester, Trying to Reach 
Retail Holders in a Proxy Fight? Go Digital, PROSEK (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.prosek.com/ 
unboxed-thoughts/trying-to-reach-retail-holders-in-a-proxy-fight-go-digital [https://perma.cc/2FBX 
-8RLM]: 
Just like in today’s political campaigns, voters are not just being influenced by what 
they read in the papers and see on TV, but they’re also influenced by what their friends 
share, tweet and like across social media channels. . . . Across the most high-profile 
proxy fights this past year, we’ve seen activists and targets both upping their game with 
integrated communications programs that combine traditional, digital and social tactics 
to reach individual holders across the country. 
 86. Press Release, American Apparel, American Apparel Board Suspends Dov Charney as 
CEO and Declares Intent to Terminate Him for Cause; Names John Luttrell as Interim CEO (June 
18, 2014), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140618006665/en/American-Apparel-
Board-Suspends-Dov-Charney-CEO [https://perma.cc/5379-L3BB].  
 87. See, e.g., Samantha Masunaga, In Lawsuit, Dov Charney Claims Conspiracy Between 
American Apparel, Standard General, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-charney-lawsuit-20150625-story.html [https://perma.cc/6EMN-AUG5] (reporting on 
a lawsuit filed by Charney against American Apparel company officials and an investor and 
explaining that “[a]lthough Charney’s lawsuit echoes many of the allegations he has made in 
previous legal documents, it presents new details of the ousted CEO’s version of how events 
unfolded”).  
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Charney had been the subject of multiple lawsuits alleging 
sexual misconduct,88 and according to the board, it suspended Charney 
based on its perceived risk of intraorganizational reputational harm, 
whereby the public scrutiny of Charney could create reputational 
damage to the broader organization. 89 
The termination itself, though, created the risk of a separate 
reputational crisis for Charney. This reputational risk potentially 
intensified when an anonymous source leaked the termination letter to 
a media source, which published the letter in full.90 This reputational 
risk was significant following Charney’s termination because 
shareholders would likely care about the reasons for his termination if 
they were going to support his efforts to regain control of the company.91 
The media, aided by information from lawsuits between Charney and 
the board, helped to fill this information vacuum. Specifically, Charney 
 
 88.  See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, Chief of American Apparel Faces 2nd Harassment  
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/business/24bias.html 
[https://perma.cc/JDB5-TX7V] (“A former American Apparel sales associate filed a lawsuit on 
Wednesday alleging she was sexually harassed by Dov Charney . . . . Her claim is part of a lawsuit 
filed in Los Angeles Superior Court that also named three other women . . . .”); Jonathan Stempel, 
American Apparel CEO Seeks End to Sex Slave Case, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2011), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-americanapparel-sex-lawsuit/american-apparel-ceo-seeks-end 
-to-sex-slave-case-idUSTRE72O5PY20110325 [https://perma.cc/KY73-9PU4] (describing the 
sexual harassment lawsuit filed by Irene Morales against Charney).  
 89. In their notice letter to Charney, the board highlighted the financial and reputational 
costs to American Apparel that they claimed resulted from Charney’s conduct. Complaint at ex. B, 
Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. BC581602 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 12, 2015), 2015 WL 2254829. 
The financial costs “included expenses associated with litigation and defense costs, significant 
settlement payments, [and] substantial severance packages.” Id. In terms of reputational costs, 
the board claimed: 
Your misconduct has also harmed the business reputation of the Company. This is 
illustrated by voluminous press reports describing your behavior and the fact that the 
Company has had a very difficult time raising capital and securing debt financing at 
reasonable rates because of your actions. Indeed, many financing sources have refused 
to become involved with American Apparel as long as you remain involved with the 
Company. When the Company has been able to secure financing, it has been required 
to pay a significant premium for that financing in significant part because of your 
conduct.  
Id. 
 90. Sapna Maheshwari, Exclusive: Read Ousted American Apparel CEO Dov Charney’s 
Termination Letter, BUZZFEED (June 22, 2014), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sapna/ 
exclusive-read-ousted-american-apparel-ceo-dov-charneys-term [https://perma.cc/7THV-ZH7].  
 91. See Am. Apparel, LLC, Schedule 13D (June 25, 2014); Susan Berfield, American Apparel: 
Charney’s Bad Behavior Was Very, Very Expensive, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-23/american-apparel-charney-fired-for-miscon 
duct-financing-problems [https://perma.cc/7ZPM-HFDW] (discussing reversal of support by 
shareholder: “At this point, I don’t think that we will support Dov.”); Matt Townsend, American 
Apparel Investor Expects CEO to Fight Termination, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2014), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-19/american-apparel-backer-expects-ceo-to-
fight-company-over-firing [https://perma.cc/7HQD-PJMX] (discussing support for Charney by 
American Apparel’s second largest shareholder). 
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had brought a number of lawsuits against American Apparel and 
individual board members.92 Some of these lawsuits raised claims for 
defamation based on the board’s communications with investors, with 
one lawsuit alleging that the board’s actions “derailed Charney’s efforts 
to regain control of the company”93 and “has and will continue to cause 
prospective investors, business leaders and businesses to shun and 
avoid doing business with Charney.”94 
While Charney did not fare well in the courts,95 his defamation 
lawsuits allowed him to introduce a competing narrative in the court of 
public opinion.96 The lawsuits provided even more material with which 
the media could tell the story of the termination, including links to court 
documents, which has reputational consequences for Charney or the 
board during the fight for control of the company.97  
2. Zone Two—Interorganizational Reputational Harm: 
Crisis Communications and Post-Crisis Litigation 
While a crisis can hurt a corporation’s reputation, not all crises 
are equal. Some crises levy greater levels of reputational harm 
depending on the blameworthiness of the corporation in the opinions of 
stakeholders.98 Crisis management scholarship identifies three types of 
 
 92. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 89; Complaint, Charney v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. 
BC585664 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 19, 2015). 
 93. Complaint, supra note 92, at 7. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Peg Brickley, Dov Charney Faces Setback in Defamation Suits Against American 
Apparel, WALL ST. J.: BANKR. BEAT (Oct. 8, 2015), https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2015/10/ 
08/dov-charney-faces-setback-in-defamation-suits-against-american-apparel [https://perma.cc/PC 
2B-PBFW]. 
96. Charney’s termination letter and his lawyer’s letter in response were made available in 
full by media sources. This publicity was important because each of these letters offered competing 
narratives explaining Charney’s termination. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 97. In 2015, American Apparel filed for bankruptcy; Charney subsequently started a new 
clothing company, Los Angeles Apparel. Jessica DiNapoli, American Apparel Files for Second 
Bankruptcy in Just over a Year, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bank 
ruptcy-americanapparel-idUSKBN1390GX [https://perma.cc/S69Y-83XK]; Matthew Townsend, 
Dov Charney Couldn’t Keep American Apparel, So He Restarted It, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(July 12, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-07-12/dov-charney-couldn-t-keep-
american-apparel-so-he-restarted-it [https://perma.cc/YKD8-AZMR].  
 98. See W. Timothy Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The 
Development and Application of Situational Crisis Communication Theory, 10 CORP. REPUTATION 
REV. 163, 166–68 (2007) (listing the other two factors as crisis history and prior relational 
reputation); W. Timothy Coombs, An Analytic Framework for Crisis Situations: Better Responses 
from a Better Understanding of the Situation, 10 J. PUB. REL. RES. 177, 181–82 (1998) (“Two 
dimensions seem to explain basic crisis attributions: external control and personal control/locus of 
causality. External control is the degree to which external agents could control the crisis event. 
Personal control/locus of causality is the degree to which the organization itself could control the 
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crises, with corresponding levels of blame attribution and reputational 
harm: victim, accidental, and preventable.99 In the first type of crisis, 
the organization is perceived as a victim of the crisis; this crisis type is 
associated with the lowest attribution of responsibility and the mildest 
reputational threat.100 The reputational threat increases with each of 
the other two types of crises, culminating with the preventable crisis, 
in which stakeholders believe that the “organization knowingly placed 
people at risk, took inappropriate actions[,] or violated a 
law/regulation.”101 This type of crisis is associated with strong 
attributions of responsibility and severe reputational threat.102 All 
things being equal, a corporation can minimize the reputational harm 
sustained from a crisis if stakeholders perceive it as a victim crisis and 
not as a preventable one.103 
The type of crisis is not a given; it is constructed. Crisis 
managers use information to control reputational damage. Specifically, 
they employ “frames” to make the underlying crisis appear more like 
one type (such as a victim crisis) and less like another type (such as a 
preventable crisis).104 Framing is part of a crisis response strategy and 
the frame promoted depends on which crisis response strategy the 
organization adopts.105 Organizations may try to deny their 
involvement through scapegoating (“blam[ing] some person or group 
outside of the organization for the crisis”) or diminishing their 
responsibility through excuse (“denying intent to do harm and/or 
claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis”).106 
Finally, crisis managers may also use “bolstering” strategies such as 
reminder and ingratiation (“[t]ell[ing] stakeholders about the past good 
works of the organization”) and victimage (“remind[ing] stakeholders 
that the organization is a victim of the crisis too”) in order to minimize 
reputational damage.107 
 
crisis event.”); id. at 187 (finding that “[c]risis types near to the high endpoint of greater personal 
control elicit stronger perceptions of crisis responsibility than those crisis types near the low end”). 
 99. Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations, supra note 98, at 168. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 167:  
A crisis manager tries to establish or shape the crisis frame by emphasizing certain 
cues. The cues include whether or not some external agent or force caused the crisis, 
whether the crisis was a result of accidental or intentional actions by members of the 
organization and whether the cause of the crisis was technical or human error. 
 105. Id. at 171. 
 106. Id. at 170.  
 107. Id.; see William L. Benoit, Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication, 23 PUB. 
REL. REV. 177, 180 (1997) (“[A] corporation may use bolstering to strengthen the audience’s 
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These types of framing techniques can also arise in post-crisis 
litigation. For example, litigation documents filed by Walgreens against 
Theranos in the wake of the latter’s blood-testing scandal not only 
addressed the economic harms that Walgreens suffered but also the 
reputational costs associated with the crisis.  
Theranos and its CEO, Elizabeth Holmes, captured the national 
stage with claims that they could revolutionize the multibillion-dollar 
blood-testing industry by providing inexpensive, direct-to-consumer 
(“DTC”) blood-testing kits that could provide results with a “few drops 
of blood.”108 The Wall Street Journal later revealed that “[a]t the end of 
2014, the lab instrument developed as the linchpin of its strategy 
handled just a small fraction of the tests then sold to consumers.”109 It 
also referenced concerns from physicians and former employees 
regarding the technology’s accuracy and Theranos’s compliance with 
federal regulations.110 The situation grew from bad to worse for 
Theranos as it faced investigations, lawsuits, and regulatory 
sanctions.111  
Theranos offered tests to the public through “Wellness Centers” 
that were located in Walgreens drugstores.112 While Theranos’s 
reputation was impacted due to its technology, Walgreens was criticized 
for a different reason. The scandal raised doubts about whether 
 
positive feelings toward the [sic] itself, in order to offset the negative feelings connected with the 
wrongful act.”). 
 108. Roger Parloff, Theranos Jump-Starts Consumer Lab Testing, FORTUNE (May 7, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/05/07/theranos-jump-starts-consumer-lab-testing [https://perma.cc/P3D4-
EPKQ].  
 109. John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggled-with-blood-tests-
1444881901 [https://perma.cc/7PX2-K9EF].  
 110. Id. 
 111. See Kia Kokalitcheva, Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes Banned from Operating a Lab, 
FORTUNE (July 8, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/08/theranos-holmes-banned/ [https://perma.cc/ 
74TZ-CQ8K] (detailing regulatory sanctions imposed on Theranos and its CEO by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services); Christopher Weaver, John Carreyrou & Michael Siconolfi, 
Theranos Is Subject of Criminal Probe by U.S., WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/theranos-is-subject-of-criminal-probe-by-u-s-1461019055 [https://perma.cc/AZ7Z-UYQD] 
(describing probes by federal criminal prosecutors, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and 
the U.S. Postal Inspection Service).  
 112. Carreyrou, supra note 109; Theranos Selects Walgreens as a Long-Term Partner Through 
Which To Offer Its New Clinical Laboratory Service, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 9, 2013), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130909005578/en/Theranos-Selects-Walgreens-Long 
-Term-Partner-Offer-New [https://perma.cc/2J74-FERD] (“Theranos, Inc. and Walgreens . . . today 
announced a long-term partnership to bring access to Theranos’ new lab testing service through 
Walgreens pharmacies nationwide.”).  
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Walgreens—a trusted household name, increasingly associated with 
consumer health—had acted as a proper steward of consumer trust.113 
These doubts were reinforced by the wave of lawsuits that piled 
up against Theranos and Walgreens in the wake of media reports and 
regulatory sanctions. For example, in R.C. v. Theranos, the plaintiff 
blamed Walgreens for Theranos’s ability to perpetuate its fraud because 
the plaintiff alleged that Walgreens’s national footprint and reputation 
“bolstered the validity of Theranos,”114 and “[d]espite all the red flags, 
Walgreens moved forward with its partnership with Theranos, provided 
Theranos with $50 million in financing and open[ed] numerous 
Theranos Wellness Centers inside of Walgreens stores.”115 A separate 
lawsuit filed shortly thereafter, L.T. v. Theranos, alleged that 
Walgreens prioritized profits over patient safety when it failed to 
perform adequate due diligence on Theranos’s technology.116 
In 2016, Walgreens brought its own lawsuit against Theranos. 
More than just seeking damages from Theranos, the lawsuit offered a 
means for Walgreens to address the reputation-damaging allegations 
raised in the lawsuits against it. The complaint asserted that 
Walgreens performed adequate due diligence before entering into a 
contract that exposed its consumers to Theranos’s new technology.117 It 
 
 113. In May 2016, Fortune published a story that accused Walgreens of failing to verify the 
technology before entering into the contract and exposing its customers to unverified technology. 
Sy Mukherjee, Walgreens Reportedly Struck Theranos Deal Without Verifying the Tech, FORTUNE 
(May 26, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/26/walgreens-didnt-verify-theranos/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UE6C-3CZF]. 
 114. Class Action Complaint and Jury Trial Demanded at 13, R.C. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16-
cv-02373 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2016), 2016 WL 3900728; see also id. at 75 (“[Plaintiff] knew of 
Walgreens’ reputation as a longstanding provider of safe and reliable pharmacy care and knew 
that Theranos’ blood testing facility was located within a local Walgreen’s store. He trusted 
Theranos and Walgreens to provide reliable test results.”). It also drew attention to affirmative 
steps Walgreens took to endorse and market Theranos’s technology, such as issuing a joint press 
release in 2013. Id. at 13.  
 115. Id. at 15. 
 116. See Class Action Complaint at 9–10, L.T. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02660 (D. Ariz. 
Aug. 5, 2016) (“According to public reports, however, Safeway pulled out of its deal with Theranos 
after its due diligence raised questions about the accuracy of the testing Theranos sought to offer.”) 
The complaint alleged that “Walgreens, exposed to nearly identical warning signs, instead 
invested $50 million into Theranos and joined Theranos in its plan to seize an outsized portion of 
the lucrative nationwide lab testing industry and capture a nationwide market of patients.” Cf. 
Class Action Complaint at 5, B.P. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02775 (D. Ariz. Aug. 17, 2016) 
(“According to published reports, throughout the process, Walgreens executives did not press for 
further verification because they were afraid Theranos would respond to questions by choosing 
another retail chain to work with as a partner.”).  
 117. Complaint at 7, Walgreen Co. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01040 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter Walgreens Complaint] (describing review performed by individuals at Johns Hopkins 
University).  
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also repeatedly referenced assurances made to Walgreens by 
representatives of Theranos.118 
The crisis management strategies of denial and diminishing 
responsibility appear in Walgreens’s litigation narratives when it 
explains how little it knew of Theranos’s practices. In its complaint, 
Walgreens alleged that Theranos went to great lengths to keep 
information about its technology’s inadequacies from Walgreens.119 
Specifically, Walgreens alleged that Theranos repeatedly refused 
Walgreens’s request for a report from a regulatory body.120 Walgreens 
also claimed that it was as much in the dark as the public and learned 
about Theranos’s misdeeds the same way the public did: press 
reports.121 According to Walgreens, media coverage, especially by the 
Wall Street Journal, filled the information gap that had grown between 
the parties because of Theranos’s unwillingness to answer Walgreens’s 
questions.122 These statements emphasize the crisis management 
strategy of excuse, where organizational actors attempt to minimize 
their responsibility for a crisis by asserting “lack of information about 
or control over important elements of the situation.”123 
The complaint also illustrates secondary strategies of bolstering. 
It incorporates reminder and ingratiation techniques by 
communicating Walgreens’s vigilance in seeking the truth despite 
Walgreens’s claims that Theranos did not share information.124 While 
drawing attention to Theranos’s conduct, the complaint emphasized 
that Walgreens never abandoned its role as a steward of its consumers’ 
trust.125 The complaint also addressed the profit motive allegation 
(raised in litigation against Walgreens and Theranos) by clarifying that 
 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 5, 6, 9, 16 (providing Walgreens’s description of assurances by Theranos 
executives and attorney); Plaintiff Walgreen Co.’s Response in Opposition to Defendant Theranos, 
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss at 3, Walgreen Co. v. Theranos, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-01040 (D. Del. Feb. 6, 
2017) [hereinafter Walgreens Opposition Brief] (“Of paramount importance, Theranos assured 
Walgreens that its innovative blood-testing technology would be safe and its operations would be 
of high quality.”).  
 119. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 15. 
 120. See id. at 18, 20–21. 
 121. Id. at 25 (“Theranos hid the CMS letter from Walgreens for almost a month. In fact, it is 
likely that Theranos would have hidden the CMS letter for longer. Walgreens learned of the letter 
for the first time on April 13, 2016, when it was reported by the press.”); Walgreens Opposition 
Brief, supra note 118, at 6.  
 122. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 18. 
 123. Benoit, supra note 107, at 180. 
 124. See Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 14 (“Walgreens promptly sought answers 
from Theranos.”); id. 28–29 (describing Walgreens’s reasons for terminating its agreement with 
Theranos).  
 125. See id. at 18–19, 27–29; see also Walgreens Opposition Brief, supra note 118, at 4 (“The 
Agreement included important provisions to safeguard the health of Walgreens’ customers and 
protect Walgreens’ reputation as a trusted provider in the communities it serves.”). 
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Walgreens’s “core mission is to help people in those communities” that 
it serves to “lead healthier and happier lives.”126  
The parties finally settled their lawsuit for an undisclosed 
amount in August 2017, resulting in the dismissal of Walgreens’s 
lawsuit against Theranos “with no finding or implication of liability.”127 
III. EXPLAINING PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFECTS: THE COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGES OF COURTS AS INFORMATION TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISMS 
 The previous Part explained why an organization in need of 
reputational repair may gain public relations benefits from post-crisis 
litigation. But identifying these benefits does not explain why courts of 
law influence public opinion to begin with. This may not be surprising 
if the information courts reveal is new, extracted from the parties 
through rules allowing for discovery. But when the information from 
litigation has already been revealed by other sources, why is it salient? 
The following Part offers three distinct but overlapping reasons why 
litigation may be superior to other types of information transmission 
mechanisms in society: relationship with media, market for 
information, and aggregation.  
A. Relationship with Media 
A reputation-building activity is only beneficial for the 
reputation-building firm if knowledge of that activity influences the 
conduct of the business’s target audience. But the activity can only exert 
such an influence if the target audience learns of it. In other words, 
there must be some mechanism by which information regarding one 
party (such as a rival) is communicated to another party (such as a 
potential entrant).  
One of the most important information intermediaries is the 
media. The media fulfills a variety of functions that impact the 
reputation of a business. First, the media addresses information 
asymmetries between firms and the public by consolidating evaluations 
of the business made by information intermediaries, such as the 
 
 126. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 1; Lydia Ramsey, Theranos Just Settled Its 
Lawsuit with Walgreens, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.timesunion.com/technology/ 
businessinsider/article/Theranos-just-settled-its-lawsuit-with-Walgreens-11723781.php 
[https://perma.cc/3PXB-PM2A].  
 127. Press Release, Theranos, Theranos Reaches Settlement with Walgreens (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170801006383/en [https://perma.cc/2NDA-XJWG]. 
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government or ratings agencies.128 Through this process, the media 
influences what issues are discussed and how they are discussed. 
Second, the media can actively contribute to the reputation of a firm 
through forum hosting. The media serves as a forum through which 
different stakeholders exchange and even debate conflicting views of a 
business.129 The media expressly cultivates this function by soliciting 
opinions of business behavior from diverse constituencies.130 In this 
way, “the media provide[s] a forum where firms and stakeholders 
debate what constitutes a good firm and which firms have good 
reputations.”131 Accordingly, the media helps to shape a business’s 
reputation, influencing how it is perceived by its stakeholders.  
The media also helps to shape the public agenda on issues 
concerning a business or even an entire industry; this is known as the 
“agenda-setting” function of the media. According to analysts of this 
function, “the day-to-day selection and display of news by journalists 
focuses the public’s attention and influences its perceptions.”132 The 
media’s coverage of a business and its activities contributes to the 
public agenda because the “prominence of elements in the news 
influences the prominence of those elements among the public.”133  
The process of agenda setting begins with the attention that a 
media organization accords a particular business and its activities or 
products.134 Through cues, such as the length of a story or its frequency, 
the public will decide which business’s behavior most warrants their 
attention.135 But the media does not stop there. It also provides a filter 
through which the public associates the business with a set of 
attributes:  
By calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, the news media influence the 
criteria by which presidents, government policies, political candidates, and corporations 
are judged. Most recently, major media attention to issues of financial reporting and 
 
 128. Deephouse, supra note 27, at 1098.  
 129. Id. at 1097–98.  
 130. Id. at 1097 (“They will ask a firm to respond to a stakeholder evaluation or ask a 
stakeholder to respond to a firm action or statement. One evaluation may lead to a competing or 
even a supporting evaluation by another source.”).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-Setting Effects of Business News on the 
Public’s Images and Opinions about Major Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 36, 36 (2003).  
 133. Id. at 36–37; see Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects in 
the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 632 (2003) (“Therefore, in 
performing its functions of informing, highlighting, and framing, the media presents market 
participants with information that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”).  
 134. Carroll & McCombs, supra note 132, at 37. 
 135. Id. 
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corporate governance suggest significant criteria for the evaluation of all companies and 
their executives, not just the companies explicitly mentioned in these news reports.136 
Thus, negative media coverage of a particular issue shines a 
light on a broad swath of firms, not just the particular firm that is under 
scrutiny.137 Given the stakes of agenda setting, businesses may choose 
not to act passively concerning how the media portrays them and may 
instead offer “information subsidies” to media sources. These subsidies 
consist of “source-provided news releases, advertisements, speeches, 
and related materials, which attempt ‘to intentionally shape the news 
agenda by reducing journalists’ costs of gathering information.’ ”138 
Through information subsidies, businesses attempt to influence 
“construction of the media agenda.”139 
One area where businesses employ information subsidies is in 
proxy fights. A number of investors obtain their information from 
financial media. The information that financial media communicates is 
therefore important to how these investors view the parties to a proxy 
fight and, in turn, may influence how the investors vote on an issue. In 
the proxy context, information subsidies include shareholder letters, 
news releases, presentation slides, memos, and even advertisements.140 
Critically, “these subsidies are made accessible to the media through 
the candidate’s campaign websites, paid newswire services, and 
required filings with the U.S. S.E.C.’s Electronic Data-Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. Filings are monitored by 
financial journalists and investors, and serve as a principal source of 
information.”141 
One case study of agenda building in the 2008 proxy contest 
between Carl Icahn and Yahoo examined party-controlled information 
subsidies and financial media coverage of the contest.142 The case study 
concluded that “[t]he issue agendas articulated in the information 
subsidies disseminated by both candidates were generally linked with 
financial media coverage of the contest. These linkages were found with 
both business newswires and newspapers . . . .”143 The research found 
 
 136. Id. at 41. 
 137. Vinit M. Desai, The Impact of Media Information on Issue Salience Following Other 
Organizations’ Failures, 40 J. MGMT. 893, 899 (2014); see also id. at 913 (noting the relationship 
between “issue salience within organizations” and “media communication . . . following other 
organizations’ failures”). 
 138. Matthew W. Ragas et al., Agenda-Building in the Corporate Sphere: Analyzing Influence 
in the 2008 Yahoo!–Icahn Proxy Contest, 37 PUB. REL. REV. 257, 258 (2011) (citation omitted).  
 139. Ragas, supra note 85, at 219.  
 140. Ragas, supra note 138, at 259. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 261. 
 143. Id. 
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that information subsidies did not generally increase the level of 
attention that the media devoted to a proxy contest; that seemed to 
relate more to the size of the firm at the center of the fight.144 However, 
information subsidies, controlled by the parties, seemed far more likely 
to relate to the media’s coverage of specific issues in the proxy contest.145 
In fact, according to the research, the media-party link goes in both 
directions so that “campaigns generally responded to – rather than 
influenced – the importance accorded specific stakeholders by 
journalists in coverage.”146 
Litigation can similarly offer important information subsidies to 
the media. First, litigation may provide journalists with access to 
sources that they could not otherwise have obtained.147 For example, in 
one of their motions, a board member of American Apparel provided a 
“sampling of ‘illicit email and text messages’ Charney allegedly sent to 
employees while still with American Apparel.”148 Media sources 
subsequently excerpted from this “sampling” in their stories about the 
battles between Charney and American Apparel.149 Litigation sources 
help journalists provide facts that the public may not get otherwise and 
by using “components” that help to tell that story, such as “good quotes, 
identifiable victims . . . , detail, and color.”150 Second, these sources are 
special not only because they may reveal unknown facts but because 
they may protect journalists from libel as well.151 Further, legal sources 
are more credible than many alternatives because “[i]nformation 
produced during litigation or investigation is given under oath, with the 
threat of legal sanction for perjury assuring more credibility than the 
journalist can find when tapping non‐legal sources.”152 
Even when litigation does not produce new information, 
journalists value legal sources because these sources can corroborate 
previous knowledge, which can help a journalist convince an editor to 
 
 144. Matthew W. Ragas, Agenda-Building and Agenda-Setting in Corporate Proxy Contests: 
Exploring Influence Among Public Relations Efforts, Financial Media Coverage and  
Investor Opinion 241 (2010), http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/UF/E0/04/15/54/00001/ragas_m.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AXK4-MFMD] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida). 
 145. Id. at 241–42. 
 146. Id. at 242. 
 147. Roy Shapira, Law as Source: How the Legal System Facilitates Investigative Journalism, 
37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 174 (2018). 
148. See Hilary Hanson, Read the Sexts Ex-American Apparel CEO Dov Charney Allegedly 
Sent Employees, HUFFINGTONPOST (June 24, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/ 
24/dov-charney-american-apparel-sexts_n_7655522.html [https://perma.cc/2MSM-R6Q6]. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Shapira, supra note 147, at 180 (footnotes omitted); see also Frankel, supra note 147, at 
365. 
 151. Shapira, supra note 147, at 174. 
 152. Id. at 174–75. 
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invest time in investigating the story.153 Additionally, legal sources can 
help contextualize and “process[ ] existing information” because 
“[j]udicial opinions or regulatory investigative reports, for example, are 
good at fleshing out patterns of misbehavior, organizing large chunks 
of information, and making it all less complex for the journalist.”154 
B. The Age of “Fake News”: Information Asymmetries in the 
Market for Information 
The information transmission capabilities of courts of law and 
the media cannot be examined in isolation. Instead, they are 
components of the broader information environment in which we are 
situated. The fate of one influences our choice to turn to the latter. In 
this environment, media stories supported by legal documents may 
have particular salience in the age of “fake news.”  
The term “fake news” is ubiquitous. It refers to “fabricated 
information that mimics news media content in form but not in 
organizational process or intent.”155 Consider the problem of “fake 
news” as another version of George Akerlof's lemons problem: We are 
consumers of information and, as consumers, we make choices as to who 
we go to for information. But consumers are faced with a plethora of 
options. If they are aware that there is some level of “fake news” 
circulating in the media, how do they sort through their options and 
differentiate “fake news” from “real news”? This task is made more 
difficult by technology, which has enabled many producers of 
information to adopt the semblance of legitimacy through professional 
designs and appearances, and sophisticated dissemination 
techniques.156 As a consequence, merchants of low-quality products 
(“fake news”) may appear very similar to merchants of high-quality 
products (“real news”) because the former are able to imitate the latter 
(in form, not content) and the latter are unable to signal their quality 
 
 153. Id. at 179. 
 154. Id. at 176. 
 155. David M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News: Addressing Fake News Requires a 
Multidisciplinary Effort, SCIENCE 1094 (Mar. 9, 2018), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/ 
sci/359/6380/1094.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W6K-N4E7]; see also Mark Verstraete, Derek E. 
Bambauer & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and Countering Fake News 8 (Ariz. Legal Studies, 
Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3007971 
[https://perma.cc/GDR4-GZHA] (distinguishing among five different types of “fake news”: hoax, 
satire, propaganda, trolling, and humor). 
 156. See Lazer et al., supra note 155, at 1094 (explaining how “the internet has lowered the 
cost of entry to new competitors”); Verstraete, supra note 155, at 10 (describing a “website that 
publishes news stories that are untrue and uses a mark that closely resembles that of CNN” and 
explaining that the “close similarity” between the two “often fools people into viewing the site as 
disseminating true information”). 
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to consumers of information.157 One study of “fake news” raises concerns 
about the ability or willingness of readers to engage in the requisite 
sorting exercise, arguing that “[r]eaders operate in digital media 
ecosystems that incentivize low-level engagement with news stories”158 
and “[c]onsumers of fake news have limited incentives to invest in 
challenging or verifying its content, particularly when the material 
reinforces their existing beliefs and perspectives.”159 
In this environment, media stories supported by litigation 
documents may be particularly salient because litigation has two 
features that address the information problem. First, there is a barrier 
to entry that usually requires access to legal expertise before a producer 
of information (a litigant) can introduce information for consumption in 
the litigation process. It is not a perfect system. It is both 
underinclusive, denying access to justice for parties with potentially 
meritorious claims who do not have access to resources, and 
overinclusive, providing access to justice for those who can access the 
resources even if they lack a meritorious claim. Second, litigation has a 
process for sorting out truth. When parties present conflicting 
narratives, the courts have mechanisms for parsing the truth from 
these narratives. As such, the media, on the one hand, and the litigants 
and courts of law, on the other, benefit from this symbiotic relationship: 
the media helps to share information from litigation (as discussed in 
Section III.A) and litigation documents help distinguish media stories 
in the market for information.  
C. Aggregation: Broadening the Audience for Knowledge 
Legal documents serve important information functions aside 
from persuading readers of the merits of the parties’ positions. Instead, 
 
 157. See Verstraete, supra note 155, at 11: 
Disclaimers about a site publishing false news stories are often buried in fine print at 
the bottom of the page, and some fake news stories reveal themselves to be fake in the 
article itself, which can be a problem in a media culture where many people do not read 
past the headlines.; 
see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 674, 676–77 (1984) (discussing the problem of imitation by sellers of 
low-quality products and the need for additional signaling strategies by sellers of high-quality 
products).  
 158. Verstraete, supra note 155, at 11; see also id. at 12–13 (discussing the problem of 
distinguishing fake news when “true and false information coexist in fake news narratives and on 
news platforms” with the result that “narratives . . . have staying power because some of the 
narrative elements are true, yet the story is presented in a way that is misleading and not true”). 
 159. Id. at 32; see also Lazer et al., supra note 155, at 1095 (“Individuals tend not to question 
the credibility of information unless it violates their preconceptions or they are incentivized to do 
so.”).  
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legal documents are good aggregators of information available from 
other sources in society.160 Lawyers support their factual and legal 
statements by citing sources that support those statements.161 The 
effect of this practice is that legal pleadings can point readers to sources 
of information other than the primary legal document (that is, to “third-
party sources”): relevant judicial opinions, regulations, government 
reports, nongovernmental organization investigations, scientific 
reports, statistical analyses, legal commentaries, economic studies, 
academic commentaries, press statements, investor reports, and media 
stories, among others.162  
Citation practice has two important information consequences. 
First, litigation documents improve the credibility of the litigant’s own 
statements by drawing on other sources; a skeptical reader may become 
more persuaded by the arguments after taking note of the supporting 
materials. Second, pleadings serve as advertisements for these other 
sources by expanding the audience for discrete sources of knowledge. 
The medical science community may heed developments shared in 
Nature and The New England Journal of Medicine, but noncommunity 
members generally may not. A pleading broadens the audience for this 
information by channeling it toward a different audience. Critically, a 
pleading also markets this information to new audiences by implicitly 
demonstrating the relevance of this information to individuals not 
primarily concerned with scientific discoveries.  
For example, in the Walgreens complaint, Walgreens points the 
reader to articles published in the Wall Street Journal, Washington 
Post, and the New York Times,163 public statements made by Theranos 
representatives,164 audit results performed by state regulatory 
agencies,165 certification reports from federal agencies,166 a study from 
 
 160. See, e.g., Parella, supra note 13, at 965–67. 
 161. See John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1011 
(2014) (explaining how advances in legal search technologies led to substantial increases in the 
number of citations per judicial opinion); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism 
as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1080, 1103 (1997) (“[L]egal decisionmaking differs from 
other forms of decisionmaking in that legal decisionmakers are often expected not only to justify 
their decisions with formal written opinions, but also to include within those opinions reference to 
the authorities on which the decisionmakers have relied.”). 
 162. See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 161, at 1012 (noting that legal search technology 
increased the availability of secondary and nonlegal sources, which resulted in “U.S. Supreme 
Court cases from 1950 to 1995 show[ing] a large spike of nonlegal sources starting in 1991”); 
Schauer & Wise, supra note 161, at 1105 (hypothesizing a change in the information sets relied on 
by lawyers and judges to now include greater diversity of sources).  
 163. Walgreens Complaint, supra note 117, at 13, 18, 23, 25, 26–27.  
 164. Id. at 14. 
 165. Id. at 15. 
 166. Id. at 16–17. 
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the peer-reviewed Journal of Clinical Investigation,167 scientific 
information from the Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine,168 and 
statements from medical academics,169 among others. Thus, the 
Walgreens complaint aggregated information from a variety of sources, 
strengthening its claims and pointing the public audience to third-party 
sources it may not otherwise consult. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS: DISTRIBUTED GAINS 
The foregoing discussion provide illustrative examples of how 
litigation allows parties to build their reputations through signaling, 
framing, or both. These examples reveal how reputational benefits can 
supply the missing value in a lawsuit that otherwise appears 
unsuccessful. But not all reputational benefits are the same. This Part 
revisits many of the examples discussed previously to introduce three 
distinct types of reputational benefits: gains distributed across time 
(intertemporal), across parties (interparty), and even across 
institutions (interinstitutional). While these gains are produced from 
the model of reputation building explained by Milgrom and Roberts, it 
is important to recognize that these distributed gains can accompany 
reputation building through litigation as well. Section IV.A expands on 
these different types of reputational gains and explains how both 
signaling and framing techniques can lead to these gains in litigation. 
Section IV.B explains the significance of this descriptive insight for 
understanding litigant incentives. Finally, Section IV.C discusses 
procedural tools that exist currently or may be adopted in order to 
discourage distributed gains from reputation-building litigation; this is 
especially significant when those gains come at the cost of a third-party 
actor, including one who may not be in court. 
A. Reputation Building and Distributed Gains 
Milgrom and Roberts’s analysis shows us that gains are 
interparty, intertemporal, and interinstitutional.170 First, costs 
incurred against one party may translate into gains against another. 
Second, gains can also be intertemporal in that losses in one moment in 
time against one party may translate into gains against another party, 
contemporaneously or in the future, through the reputation gained by 
 
 167. Id. at 21–22. 
 168. Id. at 24. 
 169. Id. at 32. 
 170. See Milgrom & Robert, supra note 14, at 302. 
4. Parella (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:21 PM 
1326 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1285 
the litigant. Finally, gains can be interinstitutional when they are 
created in one institution but enjoyed in another. For example, a party 
may build its reputation through litigation but enjoy those benefits in 
the marketplace rather than the courtroom. 
Whether by signaling or framing, reputation building through 
litigation can help supply the three types of distributed gains discussed 
above. Litigants may benefit from these gains even if they lose in the 
short term. For example, reputation building through signaling in 
litigation can help produce these three different types of distributed 
gains. Intellectual property litigation serves reputation-building 
functions because it signals to employees who might leave that exit is 
costly. Potentially departing employees confront information 
asymmetries regarding the capacity and willingness of their employers 
to file a lawsuit upon the employee’s departure. An employee must base 
exit decisions on the employer’s history of filing lawsuits, a practice that 
provides that employer with a reputation for litigiousness. Even if the 
employer plaintiff loses a case against one employee, its reputation for 
litigiousness may discourage other employees from leaving in the 
future. Therefore, the reputation gained in the initial lawsuit (or 
subsequent ones) provides the employer with retention benefits in the 
future (intertemporal) against a different set of employees (interparty). 
These effects are also interinstitutional because the reputational-
building exercise occurs in one institution (the courts) while the fruits 
of those efforts are enjoyed in another (employment relationship). 
 Similarly, reputation building through litigation is important to 
PAEs because it increases the revenue that they can earn on their 
patents, even otherwise “bad patents.”171 Therefore, patent 
infringement lawsuits brought by PAEs also offer the types of 
distributed gains discussed above. While a PAE may lose its patent 
infringement lawsuit, it gains a reputation for litigiousness that makes 
its threat to sue future companies credible, thereby making it more 
likely that those companies will agree to licensing terms that are 
beneficial to the PAE; these are both intertemporal and interparty 
gains. Additionally, these gains are interinstitutional because the 
reputation is built within the institution of the legal system but enjoyed 
as market gains through private contracting.  
Distributed gains from reputation building through framing can 
also be witnessed in litigation. In a proxy fight or other corporate battle, 
litigation narratives can help frame events in a way that is more 
beneficial for one side than the other; this framing is important when 
 
 171. Id. 
4. Parella (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:21 PM 
2019] PUBLIC RELATIONS LITIGATION 1327 
each side is vying for support from a specific party, such as from 
investors. Similarly, following the crisis, framing techniques can help 
litigants manage how third-party stakeholders perceive the crisis and 
their role in it.  
B. Distributed Gains and Litigant Incentives 
The most familiar rationale for litigation is dispute resolution: 
parties file lawsuits to receive redress from the courts for harms 
suffered. But distributed gains offer another explanation for why 
parties may litigate even when they do not expect to gain from either 
winning or settling the dispute. As this Article has illustrated, parties 
obtain benefits from litigation that do not come from the courtroom. A 
lawsuit can help cement a party’s reputation as litigious—a reputation 
that helps that party later reach desired results in its interaction with 
third parties not involved in the lawsuit. Some of these third parties 
may fear becoming future targets of similar lawsuits and may therefore 
be more willing to acquiesce to the litigious party’s demands. Or the 
lawsuit may help a party frame a crisis in a particular way and attract 
media attention so that the party can disseminate that narrative. For 
example, litigation documents may adopt crisis management strategies 
that can frame a crisis in a way that minimizes the reputational risk to 
the business litigant who is implicated in the crisis.  
But not all distributed gains are about helping the litigant. 
There is a species of lawsuits known as “malicious lawsuits” where the 
plaintiff “obtains some utility whenever the defendant is forced to 
undergo a monetary or non-monetary – e.g. reputational – loss.”172 
Here, the plaintiff “may benefit from filing even if reaching a settlement 
is not an option; he obtains utility from malice if he files and withdraws 
after having forced the defendant to incur expenses on defense.”173 In 
this situation, the plaintiff “gains” when he or she can impose some 
reputational loss on the defendant; the latter’s pain is the former’s gain 
even if the former does not obtain anything else. From torts174 to 
 
 172. Brishti Guha, Malicious Litigation, 47 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 24, 24 (2016). 
 173. Id. at 25. Guha recommends adding a “commitment requirement” to an optional 
settlement bar that “commit[s] the plaintiff to go to trial if the defendant refuses to cede or settle 
and puts up a defense.” Id. at 30.  
 174. See Hershovitz, supra note 25, at 86–102.  
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property,175 plaintiffs litigate out of revenge and spite toward neighbors, 
family, and rivals, among others.176  
Society may dislike these types of lawsuits for many reasons, 
including because the plaintiff uses the courtroom to injure the 
reputation of the defendant. But the use of the courtroom to impose 
reputational costs is not limited to malicious lawsuits; instead, this 
practice is implicit whenever we witness distributed gains. When a 
party uses litigation to build its reputation, that reputation usually 
comes at the cost of another.177 In framing techniques, a litigant 
redeems its reputation during a crisis usually by blaming another 
party. In signaling techniques, a litigant builds its reputation by 
exercising its litigation prowess against one party in order to influence 
how third parties view it. In these examples, the objects of the 
reputation-building activities often incur some kind of reputational 
cost, even if those costs fall short of the malicious action described 
above. 
C. Constraining Distributed Gains: Dismissal, Settlement Bars, and 
the Litigation Privilege 
The previous Sections explained how distributed gains operate. 
We may want to limit these gains either because we do not want 
litigants to profit in this manner or because we do not want them to 
impose reputational costs on others. While publicity around litigation 
has always had the capacity to wound a party’s reputation, social media 
and online access to information potentially deepens those wounds. 
This Section discusses different tools that may limit these unwanted 
reputational effects. 
1. Dismissals and the Timing of the Reputational Effect 
We may wonder why the timing of reputational effects matters 
so long as baseless claims are exposed and dismissed. The problem is 
the difference in timing between when the reputational effect of the 
lawsuit is achieved and when dismissal occurs. While courts may be 
very good at screening out baseless claims, this screening often occurs 
too late in the process, either when plaintiffs have already gained 
reputational advantages upon filing a lawsuit or shortly thereafter. For 
 
 175. See Katz, supra note 25, at 1456–58 (analyzing various cases in which people sued their 
neighbors to be “petty or spiteful” or to “punish the defendant”). 
 176. See Guha, supra note 172, at 26 (explaining that plaintiffs in malicious litigation cases 
bring lawsuits for the benefits they receive from imposing costs on their “rival[s]”). 
177. Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–4). 
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example, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted ShaveLogic’s 
motion for summary judgment on Gillette’s claims,178 but according to 
ShaveLogic, Gillette had already attained its desired effect upon filing: 
the lawsuit drove away potential business partners that ShaveLogic 
would need to compete in the market.179  
The timing issue challenges a fundamental assumption we have 
concerning the salience of different types of information from courts. 
We may view litigation information as significant in at least two 
different ways. First, information is significant when a court has made 
some kind of ruling in the dispute, especially concerning the liability of 
the parties involved. In this case, courts provide normative guidance on 
society’s rules and determine whether the parties have violated those 
rules. Second, courts are also unique sites for information revelation 
through the various tools available in discovery. These tools allow 
parties to learn information possessed by another. This information 
may also make its way to the public through court filings and media 
coverage of those filings. But as the ShaveLogic example illustrates, 
business litigants may achieve their reputational objectives before they 
even file suit.180 If so, the tools for identifying baseless claims become 
available too late in the process to prevent some parties from obtaining 
reputational rewards from their actions and their opponents from 
suffering the consequences. This indicates that the threat of dismissal 
may not serve as a sufficient deterrent against reputation-building 
litigation by strategic parties.181  
2. Motivations of Litigants and Settlement Bars 
Whether through framing or signaling, information from 
litigation can influence public opinion. Even early-stage litigation that 
may have a low signaling effect can influence public opinion by 
attracting media attention and communicating to the public frames and 
narratives that shape the reputation of the parties.182  
 
 178. Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 136751, 2017 BL 173926, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 
2017). 
179. Gillette Co. v. Provost, No. 15-0149 B, 2015 WL 9911345, at *3–4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 
16, 2015), 2015 WL 216997. 
 180. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 181. See also Nina Golden, SLAPP Down: The Use (and Abuse) of Anti-SLAPP Motions to 
Strike, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 426, 431 (2015) (discussing the reputational risk and 
litigation costs associated with SLAPP suits that are meritless).  
 182. See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 881 (explaining that in the defamation context, “[e]ven if the 
company ultimately decides not to pursue its action past filing a complaint, it may have won a 
symbolic victory simply by suing John Doe”); see also Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role 
in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559, 573–75 (2015) (explaining the publicity effects of 
litigation). 
4. Parella (Do Not Delete) 5/31/2019 2:21 PM 
1330 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4:1285 
The effect of public opinion is important to consider when 
creating solutions to deter socially undesirable lawsuits. To see why, 
consider nuisance suits. One proposal seeks to limit nuisance suits 
through the introduction of a “settlement bar” that would allow a 
defendant—facing a plaintiff unwilling to proceed to trial—to exercise 
an option to have the courts refuse to enforce a settlement between the 
parties.183 Denied the option to settle, plaintiffs must either withdraw 
or proceed to trial.184 Since “nuisance plaintiffs” refuse to litigate to 
trial, they will withdraw and not extract a settlement offer from 
defendants.185 If they can no longer extract a settlement offer, it is not 
rational for them to incur the costs of filing a nuisance suit and they 
will not do so.186  
The problem with applying this solution to public relations 
litigation is that it identifies a party’s incentives for litigation and 
settlement based on costs and benefits endogenous to the courts of law. 
It is assumed that litigation offers one party an opportunity to impose 
costs on another. It is also assumed that litigation allows a plaintiff to 
reap the value of many of these costs as benefits. For example, if a 
defendant pays a plaintiff a sum to settle a nuisance suit, then that sum 
is a cost that the defendant undertakes but also a benefit that the 
plaintiff reaps. But some benefits are provided neither by settlement 
nor by judicial remedy. 
Publicity associated with litigation enables plaintiffs to impose 
costs on defendants that arise from the courts of law as well as costs 
that arise from negative publicity, forcing the latter to sustain 
monetary or nonmonetary damage that it must then incur expenses to 
address.187 As an example, consider the lawsuit that Gillette filed 
against ShaveLogic at an important point in the latter’s business 
development. That lawsuit illustrates how courts of law offer one forum 
for multi-fora battles between various types of adversaries. The shot is 
fired within a legal court but the wound is felt elsewhere.  
If costs are exogenous, so are benefits.188 By filing suits, parties 
can incur benefits that are derived not directly from the courts of law 
 
 183. David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The 
Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 42, 45–46 (2006). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., Lauren H. Cohen & Umit G. Gurun, Buying the Verdict 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24542, 2018) (describing increased advertising and 
philanthropy by defendant companies following the filing of a lawsuit). 
 188. See Albert H. Choi & Kathryn E. Spier, Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in 
Litigation, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 3626 (explaining the effects of plaintiff’s financial position in 
defendant firm for litigation incentives). 
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but instead from public opinion.189 Parties may redeem their 
reputations in the wake of a scandal.190 Parties may discourage 
employee flight to a competitor191 or convince companies to acquiesce to 
licensing demands.192 These are benefits enabled by courts of law but 
found outside it. And so long as these benefits are available, parties may 
still litigate even if courts of law offer limited benefits.  
3. The Litigation Privilege 
The litigation privilege protects lawyers from “civil liability for 
statements related to litigation which may injure or offend an opposing 
party during the litigation process.”193 Historically, the privilege 
protected lawyers from suits for defamation or libel, but courts have 
applied it to a number of other claims as well.194 The privilege is 
justified on a belief that it “preserv[es] the integrity of the advocacy 
system”195 by “barring claims that would disrupt the litigation process 
or deter persons engaged in that process from performing their 
respective functions.”196  
While the litigation privilege may reduce the risk of disrupting 
the litigation process, it could simultaneously exacerbate the risk that 
parties may use litigation—and litigation documents specifically—for 
public relations effects. This is the fear that Blue Buffalo, a pet food 
company, alleged in a lawsuit it filed against Purina in response to a 
separate lawsuit that Purina filed against Blue Buffalo, which alleged 
that Blue Buffalo engaged in false advertising concerning the quality of 
its products.197 In its complaint, Blue Buffalo alleged that the litigation 
privilege facilitated Purina’s tactics: 
 
 189. See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra Part III.  
 191. See Agarwal, supra note 4, at 1367 (studying the effects that employer litigation in the 
semiconductor industry might have on the mobility of employees within the industry); Ganco et 
al., supra note 3, at 660 (examining how litigation by an employer might affect “employee mobility 
decisions”). 
 192. See Hovenkamp, supra note 5 (manuscript at 1–4). 
 193. Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 44 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 401 (2015).  
 194. T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation 
Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 927–28 (2004). 
 195. Id. at 921. 
 196. Id.; see also id. at 923 (“It is recognized that the mere threat of a lawsuit may impair an 
attorney’s ability to put the interests of his or her client first, especially when the attorney’s actions 
may be simultaneously strengthening a cause of action for the client’s adversary.”).  
 197. Complaint at 1, Blue Buffalo Co. v. Nestlé Purina Petcare Co., No. 4:14-cv-00920 (E.D. 
Mo. May 14, 2014).  
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Apparently conscious of the legal risks inherent in its smear campaign, Nestlé Purina has 
contemporaneously filed in this Court a spurious lawsuit in which it makes many of the 
same false accusations. Nestlé Purina apparently hopes that its lawsuit will protect it 
from legal action by Blue Buffalo, since statements in court papers themselves typically 
enjoy a “litigation privilege.”198  
Blue Buffalo’s complaint alleged that the centerpiece of the 
Purina public relations campaign against it is a website—the “Honesty 
Website”—that Purina launched on the very same day that it filed its 
lawsuit against Blue Buffalo.199 Blue Buffalo alleged that Purina then 
issued a press release announcing the lawsuit and promoted the 
website via its various social media channels.200 According to Blue 
Buffalo’s complaint, the website to which consumers were directed 
provided links to the complaint and exhibits that Purina filed in the 
lawsuit.201 The two parties eventually reached a confidential 
settlement, with each side agreeing to pay its own litigation costs and 
attorney’s fees.202 Additionally, Gillette tried to assert the privilege 
against ShaveLogic’s counterclaims but was unsuccessful because the 
counterclaims sought “to hold Gillette liable not for speech, but for 
conduct.”203  
These recent cases involving the litigation privilege in lawsuits 
between market incumbents and new entrants suggest two things for 
analyzing public relations litigation. First, it illustrates the concern 
that the availability of the privilege may therefore affect plaintiff 
incentives regarding public relations litigation. Second, the response of 
the Massachusetts courts in the ShaveLogic litigation suggests that 
this fear may be misplaced. At least some courts are on guard against 
the possibility that plaintiff businesses may use the litigation privilege 
as a shield to advance strategic objectives in litigation. But as discussed 
above, the denial of the privilege does not prevent a plaintiff from 
achieving its reputational goal; that carrot is still available.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article examines the reputational benefits of litigation for 
business litigants. Contrary to the view that litigation is usually bad for 
a business’s image, this Article discussed the many ways that litigation 
 
 198. Id. at 4. 
 199. Id. at 13–14. 
 200. Id. at 5–6. 
 201. Id. at ex. H (Pet Food Honesty Website).  
 202. See Steven Trader, Purina, Blue Buffalo False Ad Fight Ends with Settlement, LAW360 
(Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/859360/purina-blue-buffalo-false-ad-fight-ends-
with-settlement [https://perma.cc/DJ4W-LYRT].  
 203. Gillette Co. v. Provost, 74 N.E.3d 275, 278 (Mass. App. Ct. 2017).  
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can help a corporation or other business actor by affecting its reputation 
in the eyes of its key constituents. These reputational effects have real 
consequences for these actors’ abilities to compete and succeed.  
Litigation can bring reputational benefits even when a business 
is in a crisis. While we usually view litigation as the crisis to which 
public relations strategies respond, litigation itself can have public 
relations effects that may be valuable in crises. The framework 
provided here assists in understanding when we might expect to 
witness these reputational benefits of post-crisis litigation. It explains 
that these benefits depend on both proximity and organizational 
similarity between the parties. Depending on these factors, litigation 
can help a plaintiff with reputational repair following a crisis. In these 
situations, post-crisis litigation serves both economic and informational 
objectives.  
It is important to understand these reputational benefits for 
descriptive, normative, and policy reasons. Descriptively, reputation 
helps us to understand the benefits that litigants may receive from 
lawsuits that they do not win or expect to win. The value that a court 
fails to provide is found outside of the court in the altered reputational 
judgments of the corporate litigant’s constituents. These reputational 
judgments have financial consequences for the party that can 
compensate for the financial benefits that the party does not obtain 
from a court.  
Finally, this analysis reveals some shortcomings of the legal 
rules we rely on to eliminate frivolous lawsuits. Specifically, it 
highlights the disparity in the timing between the filing of reputational 
lawsuits and our tools for dismissing them (or otherwise discouraging 
them). In a number of situations, the reputational benefit for the 
plaintiff (and corresponding injury to defendant) occurs upon filing of 
the lawsuit or shortly thereafter. Even if a court dismisses a lawsuit, a 
plaintiff may have achieved its reputational objective. Therefore, 
strategic plaintiffs may not be deterred by these rules when they are 
not primarily concerned with the fate of the lawsuit in a court; the loss 
in the court of law may not matter so long as the court of public opinion 
offers a “win.”  
 
